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ABSTRACT: Modem American rape law is the product of historical
contingencies, compromises, legislative inattention, successful reforms, and
backlash. It is neither a puzzle to be solved nor a coherent system of rules and
values. Perhaps the clearest lesson to draw from our criminal laws regarding
sex is that there is little logic, reason, or consistency among them. As a result of
its checkered past, myths and misunderstandings about rape law abound. Jed
Rubenfeld's recent article, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of
Sexual Autonomy, exemplifies the confusion many courts, scholars, and
members of the public have about modem rape law. Rubenfeld's specific
proposal to base rape statutes on a right to self-possession, because it is derived
from mistaken premises about rape law, would likely make legal over ninety
percent of rapes in America. By replacing the non-consent element of modem
rape statutes with a narrow force requirement, Rubenfeld's recommendation
essentially decriminalizes non-stranger rape and rape by a victim's intoxication.
In this Article, I examine the missteps Rubenfeld makes to explain why he
ends up supporting such a disastrous conclusion. For example, Rubenfeld sees
the need for his right to self-possession theory because he believes that
autonomy is the sole basis that scholars offer for the foundation of rape law.
However, rape is also properly supported as an independent offense by the
nature and severity of harm caused, gender dynamics involved, and terror
inflicted on the general population by widespread sexual violence. He also uses
specious analogies and idiosyncratic conceptions of autonomy to establish the
critical components of his argument.
Despite the faults of his specific claims, Rubenfeld points rape scholars in
a worthwhile direction. Instead of seeking diminishing returns with statutory
tinkering, there is much to be gained by focusing on the foundations of rape
law. By better integrating the fundamental values that warrant robust rape laws
(autonomy, gender, harm, and terror), the major problems of high rape
prevalence, law enforcement failure, and political hostility to rape victims that
plague America can be better addressed.
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INTRODUCTION
Jed Rubenfeld offers a provocative and confused article, The Riddle of
Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, that reimagines
substantive rape law.' Rubenfeld's theory, based upon a right of self-
possession,2 contends that "sex is rape whenever exacted through the kind of
1. Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE
L.J. 1372 (2013). A reader might think that my tone and rhetoric in the Introduction and throughout this
Article are unduly harsh. Indeed, a reader might conclude that I have some personal animus toward Jed
Rubenfeld. However, we have never met and have no personal connection of which I am aware. My
choice to use strong language at times is, nonetheless, a conscious one. As I describe throughout the
Article, I believe that Rubenfeld's theory is genuinely dangerous. If put into effect, his theory might set
back rape law over fifty years. The struggles of rape law reformers would have been for naught. And
rape victims, who already face an uphill battle in the criminal justice system, would see their rapists
prosecuted and convicted at far lower rates than today. I believe such a proposal needs to be confronted
with clear, strong language indicating that his ideas should be considered as outside of the bounds of
ordinary scholarly disagreement.
2. Id. at 1426-27 ("The best way to explain how self-possession can be violated is to observe two
acts that paradigmatically do so: enslavement and torture. . . . In both cases, the victim's body
becomes-not metaphorically, but physically and actually-someone else's possession. The same is true
of rape.").
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force that turns labor into slavery: roughly speaking, physical incapacitation,
whether through restraint or imprisonment, or serious physical assault (or the
threat of either)." 3 His conception of rape would, if codified, prevent
prosecutions of the large majority of cases because it would remove the non-
consent element from rape statutes and replace it with a heightened force
requirement. Because force, particularly of the degree that Rubenfeld suggests
be proven by prosecutors, is rarely present in such cases,4 the result of enacting
Rubenfeld's theory would be that rape statutes would no longer cover most
cases involving non-stranger rapes, rapes by virtue of a victim's intoxication,
and rapes when victims are unconscious. 5 Rubenfeld's proposal would, thus,
likely decriminalize over ninety percent of rapes in America because of the
high prevalence of non-stranger rape and rarity of severe injuries to prove the
requisite force was applied or threatened.6
Notably, Rubenfeld seems aware that his proposal would entail legalization
of rape in such cases, but refers to such concerns as mere "uncomfortable
3. Id. at 1437.
4. See Michelle J. Anderson, Diminishing the Legal Impact of Negative Social Attitudes Toward
Acquaintance Rape Victims, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 644, 645-46 (2010) ("The classic rape narrative is
women from a racist and sexist mythology specific to American history. . . . Extrinsic, violent assaults
by a stranger are the weft and warp of the tale: the rapist's wielding of a knife, his dragging her into an
alley, his beating, his threat of death. Despite generations of repeated storytelling, this type of rape is, in
terms of actual incidence, a statistical outlier-so different from the norm as to be exceptional rather
than typical."). According to data from the Center for Disease Control, 5 1.1% of victims reported that
they were raped by a current or former intimate partner and 40.8% reported being raped by an
acquaintance. MICHELE C. BLACK et al., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL
INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 21 (2011); see also infra
Part Il.A.
5. Regarding non-stranger rape fact patterns, Rubenfeld recognizes that "no" will no longer mean
"no." Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1440 ("Accordingly, absent physical restraint, overpowering, violence,
or the threat of violence, rape as a violation of self-possession would fail to give 'no' the categorical
rape-creating effect a consent-based conception might give it."). For rape by voluntary intoxication of
the victim, Rubenfeld is similarly sanguine. Id. at 1440-42 (acknowledging that only involuntary
intoxication, meaning that the victim did not realize they were ingesting the intoxicant, might be
cognizable as a theory for rape due to intoxication). Concerning unconscious victims, Rubenfeld is less
clear in his concession, but recognizes that legalizing rape of unconscious victims might be a result of
his proposal. Id. at 1441-42 (contending that non-consensual sex with an unconscious person would be
rape only if the requisite force were used). In the case of an unconscious victim, Rubenfeld includes this
additional remark that seemingly supports the notion that he sees a limited downside in legalizing at
least some sex with unconscious persons under his proposal: "But really: is it so clear that all
unconscious sex should be criminal? Among well-settled couples, long used to sharing the same bed,
sexual contact of various kinds with a sleeping person is common. No one thinks all such touchings are
criminal. Doesn't this undermine the idea of an ipso facto rule against sexual contact with the
unconscious?" Id. at 1442.
6. The best available large-scale survey further found that serious injuries, other than the rape itself,
occurred in approximately 4% of all rapes. NAT'L. VICTIM CTR. AND CRIME VICTIMS RES. AND
TREATMENT CTR., RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 4 (1992) [hereinafter NAT'L. VICTIM
CTR.]. Because Rubenfeld's proposal uses a narrow force requirement, the overwhelming majority of
non-stranger rapes and rapes with limited force used will not be prosecutable. For further discussion of
the likely impact of Rubenfeld's proposal on rape prosecutions, see infra Part III.A.
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results."7 He simply fails to appreciate the magnitude and social significance
that his retheorization of rape law would have if his ideas gain traction. Under
Rubenfeld's right to self-possession, rape law would, in most ways, be in a
worse state than it was in the pre-reform era of the middle twentieth century.8
However, I write this Article not just to repudiate Rubenfeld's novel theory
of rape law. Rather, I focus on explaining how and why Rubenfeld supports
such a retrograde theory. Ultimately, Rubenfeld's errors leading him to his
disastrous conclusion highlight the need for a clearer articulation of rape law
foundations. Indeed, precisely because of its mistakes, Rubenfeld's article
provides a useful springboard for addressing common misunderstandings and
misstatements of American rape law.
The critical missteps made by Rubenfeld worth exploring in greater detail
happen at the very early stages of his argument, when he assumes that he is on
surer footing.9 Rubenfeld begins his investigation of rape law along two lines
of inquiry. Initially, he focuses his article toward solving what he terms the
"riddle" of why rape-by-deception is not recognized as rape in American law.' 0
The primary problem with his framing of rape-by-deception's special status is
that he gives an inaccurate summary of the state of rape law scholarship.
Further, although the "riddle" holds a prominent place in the title of his article,
as I will explain later, it is largely tangential to Rubenfeld's most impactful
claims.'1
More significant than his attempt to solve the rape-by-deception puzzle,
Rubenfeld revives the question of why rape should be defined as a crime
different from ordinary assault and/or battery.12 He believes that rape law
7. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1435 ("My purpose is not to show that a self-possession view of rape
eliminates all difficulties (it doesn't), but to test the limits of this view, to see what light it sheds on
controversial issues, and to acknowledge that it will sometimes lead to uncomfortable results.").
8. The "reform era" refers to the period beginning in the 1970's and ending in the 1980's when
feminists and other rape law reformers had success in persuading state legislatures to amend statutes to
reflect an updated understanding of rape. The specific reforms are discussed in greater detail in Part I.C.
9. Rubenfeld has an unusual aside in the roadmap in the introduction of his article that
differentiates the latter portion of his piece from the early arguments. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1380.
He claims that the latter portions of his piece, articulating his theory of the right to self-possession,
"should probably never have been written." Id. The implied corollary is that the early sections of his
article are not likely to raise the same level of objection.
10. Id. at 1379. See infra, Part I. (internal citations omitted). ("[S]exual autonomy seems to provide
a single, clear, appealing foundation for the regulation of sex in the United States, unifying its major
components. But there is an anomaly in the system: sex-by-deception. ... Precisely by failing to punish
rape-by-deception, sex law fails to vindicate sexual autonomy.").
I1. See infra, Part I.B (suggesting that criminalizing rape-by-deception solves the rape-by-
deception riddle proffered by Rubenfeld).
12. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1387-88 ("Why is rape a crime of its own? Every rape is an assault
or battery. Every rapist could be punished on that ground alone."); see infra, Part II.A. It is unclear if
Rubenfeld is using the words "assault" and "battery" interchangeably or as separate concepts.
Ordinarily, in criminal law, a simple assault is causing fear of immediate bodily injury. See, e.g., KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3408 (repealed 2010) ("Assault is intentionally placing another person in reasonable
apprehension of immediate bodily harm."). In contrast, a simple battery is usually the actual causing of
the bodily injury threatened in an assault. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3412(a) (repealed 2010)
[Vol. 27:14
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scholars have never explained why rape should be codified separately instead
of being prosecuted solely as a battery.13 Rubenfeld asserts that the only
possible explanation for rape being separately defined is because rape violates
an individual's sexual autonomy,1 4 a concept that he considers "irrelevant" to
rape law.15
Rubenfeld commits three fundamental mistakes that lead him astray in
discussing sexual autonomy as the sole distinguishing concept of rape law.
First, he asserts that sexual autonomy is the only value embodied in modem
rape law. That is simply wrong. In reaching his conclusion, Rubenfeld conflates
the fundamental principles justifying the existence of rape statutes with those
animating the non-consent element of the crime of rape. American rape law is
justified as a distinct crime because of numerous reasons beyond autonomy,
including the severity and nature of the harm caused, gender dynamics
involved, and terror inflicted by widespread sexual violence on the general
population. Although sexual autonomy is an important part of understanding
rape because of its connection to the non-consent element of the crime, scholars
do not contend that it alone provides a solid foundation for modem rape law.
Second, Rubenfeld seeks to reduce the history and substance of rape law,
laden with historical baggage and political half-steps, to a single animating
principle when it cannot and should not be unified as such.16 Modem rape law
is the product of a set of imperfect compromises based upon historical
contingencies. In particular, the roles of consent and autonomy have evolved
slowly due to competing political forces.' 7 To attempt to reduce the explanation
for rape law to a single value whitewashes and oversimplifies the muddled,
ugly, and sometimes inspiring course that rape law has taken in America. The
pursuit of the singular truth blinds Rubenfeld to the more complex picture of
competing values and shifting concerns that provides a richer account of
modern rape law.
("Battery is ... [i]ntentionally or recklessly causing bodily harm to another person."). The distinction is
not terribly important for Rubenfeld's argument. However, I have chosen to use the word "battery" in
most instances because it is the more serious offense and most appropriate for discussing completed
(and not inchoate) rapes.
13. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1387 ("An unanswered question lies at the heart of rape law. Why is
rape a crime of its own?").
14. Id. at 1379 ("Thus sexual autonomy seems to provide a single, clear, appealing foundation for
the regulation of sex in the United States, unifying its major components."); id. at 1392 ("For now, we
are asking how modem rape law explains itself-how rape's existence as an independent crime, graver
than almost any other assault, is explained today, now that the older feminine-purity premises are no
longer available. Enter sexual autonomy.").
15. Id. at 1424-25 ("Sexual autonomy is irrelevant to rape law.").
16. See, e.g., id. at 1423-25; see infra Part I.C.
17. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Many Faces of Sexual Consent, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 47, 53
(1995) ("Liberal consent-based regimes of legal regulation do not spring full-grown from the brow of
Zeus. They accrete over time, gradually displacing traditional status-based regimes. . . . This argument
admits that we do not enjoy a liberal regime for regulating sexuality, and that the regime we do have
reflects a mixture of consent-based and status-based rules. The ubiquitous language of consent is just a
rhetorical device for discussing the issue, but a device masking the more complex reality.").
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Third, Rubenfeld concludes that autonomy is a "red herring" for rape law
based upon an idiosyncratic definition of the concept to support an
inappropriate analogy.18 In particular, he fails to appreciate how autonomy is a
constrained value in activities that, by their nature, require mutuality.
Rubenfeld relies on a strained comparison between smoking and sex to do the
scholarly work of discounting the right to autonomy as a "myth" in modem
rape law.19 He asserts that a person being forced to smoke a cigar tests the
boundaries of smoking autonomy in a manner that sheds light on sexual
autonomy. Rubenfeld then writes that "'smoking autonomy' is wholly
irrelevant to the wrongness of [a person being forced to smoke a cigar]."20
Thus, autonomy, under Rubenfeld's view, is actually irrelevant to the debate
about smoking as it is a "red herring" to rape law.21 There are numerous
problems with Rubenfeld's analogy including: the effects of second-hand
smoke are an externality to the activity of smoking (which have no counterpart
in consensual sexual encounters); smoking, unlike sex, is a solo activity and
does not ordinarily require mutual consent; and confusing necessary and
sufficient conditions for opposing rape (and forced smoking). Nonetheless,
Rubenfeld exclusively relies on the comparison to make his case that autonomy
has no utility in understanding rape law.22
Despite my criticisms, Rubenfeld's article does offer an important,
incidental contribution to the debate about rape law: it demonstrates how
having clearly articulated fundamental values underlying rape law can have
significant substantive effects. In this Article, I explore each of Rubenfeld's
early mistakes in greater detail to offer a clearer picture of the real foundations
of rape law. In doing so, I discuss the large segments of rape law literature that
Rubenfeld overlooks creating his mistaken impressions about what scholars
have and have not written. Further, moving beyond responding to Rubenfeld, I
reconcile different strains of rape law theory to offer a clear explanation of rape
law's foundations based upon the principles of autonomy, gender, harm, and
terror.
This Article is divided into three parts. First, I briefly discuss Rubenfeld's
riddle of rape-by-deception and his errors in analyzing it. Second, I explore
Rubenfeld's contention that rape can only be justified as a crime separate from
battery through the unique violation of sexual autonomy and Rubenfeld's
misreading of the rape law literature about sexual autonomy. Third, I analyze
18. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1424 ("In fact, sexual autonomy is a red herring when it comes to
rape."); see infra Part 111.
19. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1413 ("[T]he supposed right of sexual autonomy is a myth and
should be rejected.").





the catastrophic effects Rubenfeld's theory would have if adopted by any
jurisdiction.
I. RUBENFELD'S RIDDLE
Rubenfeld's article explores various threads of substantive rape law as well
as other scholarly discussions orthogonal to that topic. He writes of rape law's
history, the debate about rape-by-deception as a type of rape, the recent
embracing of autonomy as a means of understanding consent, the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence regarding the constitutional right to privacy, anti-sodomy
laws, torture, the right to self-possession, and traditional sexual mores. Rather
than discussing mistakes in regards to each of the issues Rubenfeld addresses, I
concentrate on his key claims. In this Part, my focus is on the device he uses to
frame his article, the so-called "riddle" of rape-by-deception.
A. Deception Exception
Rubenfeld's initial concern is solving what he terms a "riddle" about why
rape-by-deception is not recognized as rape in American law.23 His end goal in
solving the riddle is to make rape law theoretically consistent. The riddle of
rape-by-deception, as laid out by Rubenfeld, is as follows:
Thus sexual autonomy seems to provide a single, clear, appealing
foundation for the regulation of sex in the United States, unifying its
major components. But there is an anomaly in the system: sex-by-
deception. From autonomy's viewpoint, fraud is as great an evil as
force. Precisely by failing to punish rape-by-deception, sex law fails to
vindicate sexual autonomy. This failure would seem to put rape law in
tension not only with its own central principle, but with the rest of
American sex law, including Lawrence [v. Texas].24
Before even delving into the riddle in detail, Rubenfeld makes an unusual
concession recognizing that, under modern American law in many
jurisdictions, one solution to it has already been implemented.25 He notes that
the separate force element of rape, which necessitates the defendant use or
23. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1376. Rubenfeld does discuss cases and courts in Israel, Germany,
and England as well. Nonetheless, his focus is primarily on American rape law, which has developed in
a different manner than in other nations.
24. Id. at 1379. The reference by Rubenfeld to Lawrence is certainly out-of-place, but it is not
directly relevant to the riddle. I will return to Rubenfeld's unusual, and fundamentally flawed, analysis
of Lawrence in Part II.B.
25. Id. at 1378.
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threaten less force than in Rubenfeld's normative proposal, solves his riddle. 26
The reason that the force requirement provides doctrinal consistency in regards
to rape-by-deception is that such cases would not be prosecutable because no
force ordinarily accompanies deception. The coherence of rape law doctrine is
achieved by legalizing rape-by-deception in all cases when force is a statutory
element of rape. So, if the riddle is solved by the force requirement and there is
no glaring inconsistency in rape law, why proceed further?27
At this point, Rubenfeld says there is still a riddle because scholars
overwhelmingly want to eliminate the force requirement and many jurisdictions
have removed it.28 Both those claims are true, but it does seem like the
motivation for doctrinal purity is lessened a bit when focused primarily on a
perceived inconsistency that would exist if most legal scholars had their way.
Indeed, rape law and academic inquiry about it would be radically different if
scholars had that level of influence in the policy realm.
Nonetheless, I want to engage Rubenfeld's argument on his descriptive
terms in a world where the only elements to rape are non-consent and a sex act
(and no force requirement exists). In that case, Rubenfeld contends that rape-
by-deception is a glaring mistake at the center of rape law.29 In particular, he
writes that consent is always abrogated by force or fraud and that rape law's
failure to recognize the inconsistency is highly problematic. 30
26. Id. ("Existing doctrine has no trouble dismissing rape-by-deception claims, but only because of
the much-decried force requirement.").
27. In his response to some critics, Rubenfeld seemingly reverts to defending the status quo in
regards to having both a force and consent element. However, his defense is incompatible with his
original position. He states:
My article doesn't argue that rape law can give no role to consent. It argues that rape law has
to include an element in addition to consent (force). I don't argue against all autonomy
protections in the law. I argue against the idea that there is a fundamental right to sexual
autonomy.
Jed Rubenfeld, Rape-by-Deception-A Response, 123 YALE L.J. F. 389, 393 (2013). It is difficult, if not
impossible to harmonize his new position with his original theory for numerous reasons. First,
Rubenfeld previously stated that sexual autonomy was "irrelevant," a "red herring," and a "myth."
Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1424-25. To now state that he supports autonomy and a consent element in
addition to the force requirement is sheer revisionism. Second, his new statement amounts to a simple
defense of many (if not most) jurisdictions in the United States, which use both a consent and a force
requirement. If that is the case, his argument is neither novel nor helpful. Third, if consent is still an
element under Rubenfeld's proposal, what is the normative basis for it? The theory of self-possession
does not support a consent element. And Rubenfeld contends that autonomy theory cannot provide a
foundation because of the so-called "riddle" of rape-by-deception. So, is Rubenfeld merely supporting a
consent element for pragmatic reasons (which is at odds with his project of doctrinal consistency) or is
he simply abandoning his original project entirely? For purposes of this Article, I assume he still stands
by the original claims he made in the Yale Law Journal.
28. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1378.
29. Id. at 1395 ("But this picture of American sex law can't account for a peculiar and thorny
anomaly: sex-by-deception.").
30. 1 have attempted to outline and represent Rubenfeld's article as fairly and honestly as possible.
However, in responding to some initial criticisms, Rubenfeld contends that his work has been misread.
He argues:
My account of rape, however, is not opposed to this "vast array" of different crimes. My
article never says that there can be only one sex crime-rape. On the contrary, as I say
repeatedly throughout my article, states are free to (and I think they should) criminalize many
[Vol. 27:18
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B. Deception and Autonomy
Rubenfeld contends that any version of sexual autonomy must recognize
the crime of rape-by-deception as rape or the doctrine is untenable. His claim is
that autonomy's guarantee of true consent is violated by both fraud and force.
Because modern rape law fails to recognize instances where fraud vitiates
consent, Rubenfeld believes that rape law is not true to its core value of
autonomy.
Rubenfeld faces a significant problem in that there is a much easier
solution to the riddle than the one he proposes. Indeed, it is one supported by
many of the same scholars that argue against the force requirement. If rape-by-
deception is an unjustified exception, then it can be solved simply by
criminalizing it. Many feminists and rape law reformers have argued as such.
Such a proposal would address the doctrinal concerns of Rubenfeld while
avoiding the legalization of most rape that Rubenfeld's solution entails.
Notably, though, the theory of self-possession solves the riddle in the other
manner-he decriminalizes all rape-by-deception including the two instances
when it is punished in modem America (as part of a medical procedure or when
a victim wrongly believes that she is having sex with her spouse). 32
sex acts that aren't rape. Professor Falk's reasoning is like saying that someone who argues
that murder does not include negligent homicide is against the criminalization of negligent
homicide.
Rubenfeld, supra note 27, at 399 (internal citations omitted). Rubenfeld's revision either undoes his
entire argument or offers nothing of significance. If Rubenfeld is contending that non-forcible rape is
still punishable as a lesser sexual assault based upon a non-consent element, then his project is for
naught. Instead of calling his original article the "The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception," it would simply
need to be renamed "The Riddle of Sexual-Assault-by-Deception," and Rubenfeld's same criticisms
would still apply. If this is his position, it also illustrates his confusion with modem rape law, as the
terms "sexual assault" and "rape" are often used interchangeably (at least for the highest degrees of
sexual assault). In fact, some jurisdictions do not use the word "rape" in their so-called "rape" statutes.
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 2014).
Following Rubenfeld's citations to his original article yields a different interpretation of his new
statement. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1416-17 & n.185, 1435 n.227, 1440. The other crimes that
Rubenfeld imagines are consistent with his proposal are: non-disclosure of a sexually transmitted
disease, rape-by-deception through a medical procedure, rape-by-deception by fraudulently representing
a spouse, and having sex with an unconscious person (although only punishable as an assault and/or
battery). In other words, he reduces rape of an unconscious person to a mere battery and otherwise
maintains the status quo rules for rape-by-deception. In no way do these concessions ameliorate the
harms articulated in this Article because of the rollback of non-forcible rapes entailed by Rubenfeld's
proposal.
31. See, e.g., Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 39, 180
(1998) ("As the twenty-first century approaches, the evolution of rape law to condemn those persons
who accomplish sexual intercourse by means of fraud or coercion is long overdue."). A response to
Rubenfeld's article has similarly supported this solution to the "riddle." Tom Dougherty, No Way
Around Consent: A Reply to Rubenfeld on "Rape-by-Deception," 123 YALE L.J. 321, 333-34 (2013)
(contending that rape by deception is an affront to sexual autonomy and should be criminalized as such).
32. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1397-98 ("In the United States, courts have long endorsed the
medical exception, while the spousal-impersonation exception is the law of at least fourteen states,
including California, and is recognized in the Model Penal Code." (internal citations omitted)). There is
ambiguity as to the magnitude of those exceptions and whether other exceptions might exist. However,
for purposes of this Article, there is no reason to quibble with Rubenfeld's claim.
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Of course, whatever a person believes about criminalizing rape-by-
deception, such beliefs do not necessarily indicate a corresponding view that
(de)criminalization is based upon consistency. Rubenfeld, however, believes
that there is clearly tension and cites a wide range of court cases to support the
general proposition that fraud always abrogates consent. 33 As such, rape law
seems like an outlier-one that Rubenfeld feels must be rectified.
However, there is a common thread to most of the citations and examples
used by Rubenfeld: they stem from private, and not public criminal, law.34
Others concern criminal procedural issues separate from defining elements of
crimes such as consent to search in regard to the Fourth Amendment. 35 One of
the realities that every scholar or practitioner in criminal law must recognize is
that criminal statutes abuse basic vocabulary and co-opt language from other
doctrinal areas with no respect for the source definitions or rules. For example,
in criminal law the word "voluntary" is used and abused in a multitude of ways.
For actus reus, "voluntary" acts include conduct that shows any volition of will,
including situations where a person has a literal gun to her head when
committing criminal acts.36 When discussing "voluntary" abandonment of
inchoate crimes, the definition is much broader, recognizing that threats or
resistance render acts "involuntary." 37  In the context of "voluntary"
manslaughter, the word is normally used to indicate intentional killings
committed due to the defendant being in a heat of passion and, unlike the
previous two definitions, makes no reference to external influence by other
33. Id. at 1376 n.11.
34. See McClellan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 247 A.2d 58, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (discussing how
deception, in a civil action related to a driver giving a car to a parking attendant, vitiated consent); Kreag
v. Authes, 28 N.E. 773, 774 (Ind. App. 1891) (stating the general proposition that fraud abrogates
consent in the context of a civil suit regarding a father's unlawful abduction and sexual abuse of his
child); Chatman v. Giddens, 91 So. 56, 57 (La. 1921) (examining how fraud to induce a contract
implicated a mineral royalties dispute); Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New Eng., Inc., 571 N.E.2d 340, 352
(Mass. 1991) (discussing how duress and fraud vitiate consent in a child custody dispute); Dellavecchio
v. Hicks, No. FD-04-1038-90, 2006 WL 727770, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 23, 2006) (per
curiam) (analyzing consent and fraud in a child support dispute); Lawyer v. Fritcher, 29 N.E. 267, 268
(N.Y. 1891) (writing that "fraud vitiates all contracts and all consents" in an abduction case).
35. See United States v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 439 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that the consent of a
defendant for a police search could not be based upon misrepresentations by the officer); United States
v. Hardin, 539 F.3d 404, 425 n.12 (6th Cir. 2008) (discussing an officer's use of a ruse to gain access to
a defendant's apartment as implicating valid consent in certain circumstances); United States v. Sheard,
473 F.2d 139, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wright, J., dissenting) (contending that the police officer's
misrepresentations denied true consent by the defendant); Jeffcoat v. United States, 551 A.2d 1301,
1304 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating the general rule that fraud abrogates consent in a footnote that the
court finds is "ofno significance" to the present criminal matter).
36. RICHARD J. BONNIE, ANNE M. COUGHLIN, JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. & PETER W. Low, CRIMINAL
LAw 69 (3d ed. 2010).
37. Id. at 393-94.
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actors. Each definition of "voluntary" is separate within criminal law and to
other doctrinal uses as well.
This does not mean that criminal law should operate in the manner that it
does. However, because Rubenfeld relies heavily on his particular descriptive
account of criminal rape law to enable the contentions in both his normative
and descriptive theories, it is worth noting the disjunction between vocabularies
in criminal and other areas of law. Further, the examples illustrate why it is so
problematic to assume universality of the definitions of consent.
The concept of "consent" has different meanings across various areas of
law. If a patient is about to have open-heart surgery, she must be properly and
fully informed about the objective risks of the procedure and sign a knowing
waiver of liability to have consented to the procedure. Certain contracts cannot
be consented to, such as prostitution or organ sale, because of public policy
reasons. Real estate sales have different rules of consent than spoken contracts
for five-dollar loans to friends.
In substantive criminal law, "consent" is treated as a far broader concept
than in other areas of law. In rape law in particular, affirmative consent is
usually only abrogated by forcible compulsion (or threat thereof) or
incapacitation. There are good reasons why consent is more broadly defined in
criminal rape law. Unlike in a tort action, a defendant might be sentenced to
long-term imprisonment if he is the losing party at trial. Further, in criminal
law particular elements contain both actus reus (conduct) and mens rea (mental
states). 39 That means that a fact-finder must determine beyond a reasonable
doubt that consent was not given (the act) and that the defendant's mistake of
consent was either unreasonable or dishonest.40 Particularly because of the
mens rea issues involved in a sexual encounter, which typically includes far
less communication (written, verbal, or nonverbal) than even the most basic
contract, rape law must use simpler bright-line rules. It is a pragmatic necessity
because determining a defendant's mental state at the past moment of the act of
the crime is extremely difficult even with simplified concepts.41 If every sex act
38. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 535 (5th ed. 2009) ("Under common law
principles, an intentional homicide committed in 'sudden heat of passion' as the result of 'adequate
provocation' mitigates the offense to voluntary manslaughter.").
39. Id. at 117 (describing the structure of American criminal law wherein an act and mens rea are
ordinarily both needed for a defendant to be guilty). My definition of mens rea is incomplete or slightly
askew in the interest of brevity. Any larger discussion of the definition of mens rea would constitute an
unnecessary diversion from the major points of this Article. As many scholars have documented, the
difficulties in defining mens rea with precision are endemic to the concept. See, e.g., GEORGE
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 398 (1978) ("There is no term fraught with greater ambiguity
than that venerable Latin phrase that haunts the Anglo-American criminal law: mens rea."). The
problems in defining the exact contours of mens rea have no bearing on the point I am arguing in this
instance, so the brief definition I offer should suffice.
40. This is presuming the general intent mistake instruction of common law jurisdictions, which is
the usual rule in American states, is used. DRESSLER, supra note 38, at 595.
41. Id.at 586.
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was subject to a written and notarized contract, then borrowing definitions of
consent from contract law would make sense. That is not the reality of sex in
America, though.
Returning to Rubenfeld's citations, there is a body of cases he references in
a footnote that are worth exploring in greater detail. The cases that Rubenfeld
identifies, which are closest to defining "consent" in the context of a criminal
statute element, concern burglary, theft, or kidnapping based upon false
42
pretenses. In Johnson v. State, cited by Rubenfeld, the defendant gained
admission to a laundromat by tricking the owner into allowing him onto the
premises.43 As elaborated upon later in greater detail in Part II.B.3, Rubenfeld's
discussion of burglary is notable because there are strong doctrinal connections
between theft and rape (unlike battery and rape). Similarly, Rubenfeld cites
cases concerning larceny and embezzlement as well as another burglary fact
pattern that are inapplicable for the same reasons as Johnson.44
The primary problem with Rubenfeld's citations to burglary, theft, and
kidnapping cases is that he fails to consider the issue of materiality. Materiality
of a deception differentiates an ordinary lie from actual criminal fraud. In a
burglary case, a defendant's inaccurate statement that she works for the gas
company is material to gaining consensual entry. Similarly, false promises of
employment that turn into a kidnapping are directly relevant to the consent
given by the victim. However, a door-to-door salesperson who wears a toupee
is not committing fraud by virtue of hiding his baldness when selling his wares.
The two recognized exceptions cited by Rubenfeld to the rape-by-
deception rule, medical procedures and confused identity of whether a victim is
having sex with a spouse, can be persuasively argued to represent criminal
law's incorporation of the idea that the deception must be material for consent
to be vitiated. Consider the following lies someone could use directed at
another person in an effort to receive sexual consent:
1. "I am a millionaire."
2. "I am good friends with your friend Steve."
3. "I am 29 years old (and this is not my real age)."
4. "I love you."
42. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 921 So. 2d 490, 508 (Fla. 2005) (per curiam).
43. The court in Johnson treats the issue of consent as a defense and not an interpretation of the
elements of the crime. Id. However, other burglary statutes do include an implicit consent element by
differentiating "lawful" and "unlawful" access to a property. So, despite that procedural difference,
Rubenfeld's citation to the general issue of burglary-by-deception is appropriate.
44. Farlow v. State, 265 A.2d 578, 580 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970) (analyzing a larceny and
embezzlement fact pattern where defendants removed property from storage); State v. Ortiz, 584 P.2d
1306, 1307-08 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978); People v. De Leon, 16 N.E. 46, 48 (N.Y. 1888) (finding that the
defendant was guilty by essentially using fraudulent promises of employment in Panama to kidnap a
victim); Elliott v. State, No. 05-10-00049-CR, 2011 WL 2207091, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. June 8, 2011); cf
People v. Traster, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 680, 688 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing larceny by trick (citing 2
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 8.7, at 396 (1986))).
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5. "I am shipping out tomorrow to Afghanistan in the Army."
6. "If you have sex with me, I will hire you for a high-paying job."
Under existing rape law, those lies do not abrogate a victim's consent to
sexual activity. Importantly, none of the lies fit the two categories of criminal
rape-by-deception presently recognized because there is neither a medical
procedure nor spousal confusion. Yet, for at least some people in the world,
each of those lies might be subjectively material to the decision to have sex. So
why does criminal law focus only on the deceptions involving medical
procedures and mistaken identity of a spouse?
The answer is in differentiating the types of lies made. In each of the six
examples I gave above, a person would still be consenting to commit a mutual
sex act with a specific person. That is, a person knows that the other person in
front of her is the one that she will be having sex with and knows the sexual
activity that will occur. In contrast, in the case of medical procedures such as
surgery, the patient is not consenting to the sex act performed with the doctor
even though she might be committing to penetration for surgery. Similarly, if a
defendant sneaks into a dark room pretending to be someone's spouse and has
sex with her, the victim has never consented to have sex with the defendant in
particular.
The rape-by-deception rule in its current form can be justified as
embodying the objective materiality requirement for fraud. The forms of
deception in the two recognized exceptions are universally material and not
based upon subjective reasons that certain people choose to have consensual
sex. Lies that call into question the acts being done (the medical procedure
exception) and the identity of the person (the mistaken identity of the spouse
case) are considered material. All other lies are considered immaterial because
the person consenting knows the person and act to which she is agreeing. If I
am right about the materiality of the recognized rapes-by-deception, then
Rubenfeld's riddle is solved on its own terms. This is because adding rape-by-
fraud to modem statutes would only include material instances of such
conduct-the medical procedure and mistaken identity cases. As such, there is
no doctrinal inconsistency because only material deception is punished in rape-
by-deception cases. And, consequently, there is absolutely no need for rape law
to be fundamentally retheorized in the manner proposed by Rubenfeld.
At the end, though, the riddle of rape-by-deception is a distraction to the
major arguments made by Rubenfeld at the foundational level of rape law. The
various permutations of beliefs about the riddle are consistent with Rubenfeld's
self-possession theory and modem rape law theory articulated by other
scholars. One could believe there is no riddle, support criminalization of rape-
by-deception, and, thus, subscribe to modem rape law theory. Or, one could
believe there is a riddle, support criminalization of rape-by-deception, and,
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thus, subscribe to modern rape law theory. Or, like Rubenfeld, one could
believe there is a riddle, support decriminalization of rape-by-deception, and,
thus, subscribe to self-possession theory. Although Rubenfeld's perceived
riddle is worth debating, it is orthogonal to questions about sexual autonomy
and the right to self-possession.
C. Rape Law Inconsistency
The implicit belief underlying Rubenfeld's argument and line of inquiry is
that rape should be understood through a single animating principle. Indeed, the
focus on rape-by-deception as the critical problem in rape law highlights the
idea that complete doctrinal consistency is the ultimate end sought.
Universality in criminal law is a strange aim for a system where states enact
statutes independent from each other representing a diversity of approaches.
The goal of doctrinal purity is questionable in regard to any area of law,
but particularly inappropriate in regard to rape law. Rape law is part of a
tapestry of statutes concerning sexual behavior. Such statutes are the product of
a messy and ugly history of misogyny, sexual violence, and governmental
indifference in America. A descriptive theory of rape law that hinges on a
single concept is inevitably inaccurate, incomplete, and unwise.
Rubenfeld's assumption that rape law can and should be treated as a set of
rules without contradiction flies in the face of the history of criminal laws
regulating sexual violence in America. Perhaps the clearest lesson drawn from
our criminal laws regarding sex is that there is little logic, reason, or
consistency among them. If criminal sex laws were coherent, a person who
possesses child pornography would not ordinarily receive a far longer sentence
45than a child rapist. People guilty of public urination would not have to move
far away from schools, playgrounds, and bus stops because they are classified
as "sex offenders." 46 Legislatures would focus on the increasing incidence of
rape47 instead of foolishly pursuing sex offender registries, residency
restrictions, and post-imprisonment civil confinement that target offenders
responsible for a small percentage of future sex offenses.48 Hundreds of
45. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88 WASH. U.
L. REv. 853, 860-61 ("[M]odern practices have resulted in some defendants who possess child
pornography receiving longer sentences than defendants who sexually abuse children. One recent study
of federal sentencing practices documents that a typical possessor of child pornography will receive a
significantly longer sentence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines than a defendant who engages in
repeated sex with a twelve-year-old girl.").
46. Pauline Vu, Worth Noting, STATELINE (Sept. 5, 2007), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/lGl-
168408089.html (describing the concerns of one lawmaker who proposed making public urination a
separate offense from indecent exposure so that New Hampshire would no longer be one of the states
that lists such offenders on the state's sex offender registry).
47. See infra Part Il.B.1.
48. Patrick A. Langhan, et al., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from
Prison in 1994, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 1-2 (2003),
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thousands of rape kits would not go untested, allowing serial rapists to find
more victims while their DNA sits for years or decades on warehouse shelves.49
Attempting to decipher puzzles of sexual violence law is trying to reason the
unreasonable.
Consider the modem history of rape law beginning with the reform
movement gaining influence in the 1970s. Rape became a crime solely because
of male interests in their current or prospective spouses.50 As a result, early
common law definitions focused on protecting that concern with little regard to
the rights of victims. The traditional elements of the crime of rape entering the
reform era were: "(1) sexual intercourse; (2) between a man and a woman who
is not his wife; (3) achieved by force or threat of severe bodily harm; and (4)
without her consent."51 Although not always legislatively codified, jurisdictions
regularly enforced the utmost resistance requirement such that rape victims had
to resist a sexual assault to their dying breath for there to be a "rape." 52 In 1973,
a New York appellate court issued one of the last reported decisions upholding
the utmost resistance requirement to overturn a jury verdict.53 Courts held that,
even in the face of specific violent threats, consent could be given through
"voluntary" submission to the rapist.54 As a result, if a victim eventually gave
up resisting, courts would interpret the event as consensual sex.
Susan Brownmiller, Catharine MacKinnon, and other feminists attacked
such outcomes and led an effort to reform rape law throughout America. 56In
1975, Michigan became the first state to adopt portions of the rape law reforms
suggested by feminists.5 7 Rape law reformers achieved several victories in
changing the application of substantive rape law: rape became gender-neutral;
all types of sexual penetration were criminalized (and not only vaginal
58intercourse); and marital rape was finally made illegal. More recently, many
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf (finding that even among criminals released from
prison, thus excluding first time offenders and offenders with lesser sentences, non-sex offenders
committed six times as many sex crimes as sex offenders). See also LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD,
RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994, at 2 (2003) (showing that sex
offenders have a similar rate of recidivism to violent felons).
49. Nicholas Kristof, Want a Real Reason to Be Outraged?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2012, at 13 ("By
most accounts, hundreds of thousands of these untested kits are stacked up around the country. . . . In
Michigan, the Wayne County prosecutor, Kym Worthy, said she was shocked to discover more than
11,000 rape kits lying around untested-some dating to the 1980s. So far, of 153 kits tested, 21 match
evidence in a criminal database and may involve serial rapists.").
50. See infra Part H.A.
51. David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 320-21 (2000).
52. DRESSLER, supra note 38, at 590.
53. People v. Hughes, 343 N.Y.S.2d 240, 242 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973).
54. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE
OF LAW 19 (1998).
55. Id. at 19-20.
56. Id. at 25.
57. Id. at 29.
58. Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force
and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1783 (1992).
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jurisdictions eliminated the force requirement, making non-consent and the sex
act the only two elements of rape.59
However, despite those victories, the application of rape law in many cases
did not change. Courts continue to define rape narrowly even without statutory
language supporting such interpretations. 6 Juries continue to be skeptical of
rape victims and hold them to a much higher standard than victims of other
crimes. Reforms have had no measurable effect in some jurisdictions, while
62
others have shown only modest progress. What little success has occurred is
largely attributable to increased cultural awareness of non-stranger rape rather
than legal change. In many states, a strict requirement that the accuser show
the defendant used or threatened actual force effectively blocks convictions
even in extreme cases.64 Most states do not recognize a verbal "no" by a
65
complainant as determinative of non-consent. Other states maintain a
variation of the resistance requirement that is often applied in the same way as
its more stringent predecessor.66 Consequently, while a formal "utmost
resistance requirement" has been removed, it is de facto enforced by jurors and
judges in rape trials across the country. Rubenfeld's discussion of the right to
self-possession is unfortunately silent on how to confront the multitude of
obstacles and much greater inconsistencies in sexual violence law. Instead, his
theory at best resolves a minor wrinkle while aggravating far greater problems.
It is also extremely difficult to discuss the history of rape law in isolation
from other sex crime statutes. For example, child molestation was not a
separate crime until the twentieth century and was recognized only as statutory
rape previous to that time.67 Anne Coughlin's work demonstrates that modem
59. SCHULHOFER, supra note 54, at 32-33.
60. Bryden, supra note 51, at 321-22.
61. ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 6 (1999).
62. Id. at 7.
63. Bryden, supra note 51, at 319 (internal citations omitted) ("Meanwhile, a growing body of
social-scientific evidence indicates that, contrary to reformers' expectations, the much-heralded
evidentiary reforms have had little impact on reporting, processing, and conviction rates in rape cases.
Although this evidence is not yet conclusive, it strongly suggests several tentative conclusions. First,
women seem to be increasingly willing to report rapes. Anecdotal evidence indicates that juries are
increasingly sympathetic to the prosecution. This progress, however, appears to be due mainly to
evolving public attitudes toward acquaintance rape rather than specific legal changes, except insofar as
national publicity accompanying the changes may have affected attitudes everywhere.").
64. SCHULHOFER, supra note 54, at 4-10 (discussing numerous cases and scenarios where the force
requirement blocks prosecution and conviction for rape).
65. Deborah Tuerkheimer, We preach "no means no" for sex, but that's not what the law says,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 12, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/12/rape-definition-
use-of-force ("in most states, the legal definition of rape still requires the use of physical force. In other
words, a verbal 'no' isn't always enough.").
66. SCHULHOFER, supra note 54, at 127.
67. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construction of the Closet: American Regulation of
Same-Sex Intimacy, 1880-1946, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1007, 1061-62 (1997) ("In the first half of the new
century, many states adopted new carnal abuse and child molestation statutes that explicitly applied to
men's molesting of boys as well as girls. Generally, the big population states were the first to act,
starting in the very first decade of the century. . . . Following the early leads of Illinois and California,
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rape law was born out of adultery statutes as non-consent was treated as a
defense in adultery cases in later time periods. The catch-all label "sex
offender" has combined rapists, flashers, child pornographers, obscene movie
distributers, voyeurs, and others into a single category, which allows
prosecutors to offer plea deals for lesser crimes to rapists while ensuring the
same collateral punishments of registration, residency restrictions, and civil
commitment.69 Distilling the discussion of the legal history of rape in isolation,
as Rubenfeld does, inextricably leads to erroneous conclusions about the nature
and evolution of rape law.
America's high level of sexual violence is what Horst Rittel and Melvin
Webber term a "wicked problem."7o Wicked problems stem from an
intersection of, among other factors, historical, cultural, and social
circumstances. By their very nature, such problems require multiple avenues
of solutions and are not resolved through single mechanisms. 72 The history of
rape in America illustrates that it fits the classic attributes of a "wicked
problem" and should not be approached with the idea that a single theoretical
panacea could provide any long-lasting solution. Even if Rubenfeld's proposal
were a wise one, it is far too simplistic and reductionist to have significant
substantive effect.
Further, Rubenfeld's project of explaining rape law, from a descriptive
perspective, should not proceed along a highly reductionist view of history if it
seeks accuracy on the subject. The singular focus ignores the roles of sexism of
legislatures and judges who determined the direction of rape law. 73 It ignores
the systemic patriarchy that emboldened rapists while restraining government
prosecution of sexual violence. 74 It hides the partial success of the reform
movement that achieved most of its substantive law tinkering goals but did not
New York created a new felony for an adult who carnally abuses the body, or indulges in any indecent
or immoral practices with the sexual parts or organs of a child under the age of ten years, and a
misdemeanor for an adult who carnally abuses a child aged ten to sixteen. . . . Most of the urbanized
states of the Midwest and the East and West Coasts followed this pattern. Typically, southern and
noncoastal western states did not adopt such statutes until World War II and afterward.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
68. See generally, Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1 (1998) (discussing how rape
law emerged from an affirmative defense to adultery prosecutions).
69. See generally Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 435 (2010) (analyzing the growing use of collateral restrictions on the heterogeneous
class of sex offenders).
70. See generally Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of
Planning, 4 POL'Y SCIENCES 155 (1973).
7 1. Id.
72. Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Planning Problems are Wicked Problems, in
DEVELOPMENTS IN DESIGN METHODOLOGY 135 (Nigel Cross ed., 1984).
73. SCHULHOFER, supra note 54, at 1-4.
74. Richard Klein, An Analysis of Thirty-Five Years of Rape Reform: A Frustrating Search for
Fundamental Fairness, 41 AKRON L. REV. 981, 984 (2008).
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change the application of rape law substantially.75 The story of rape law is a
complex narrative and cannot be captured by the lone value of sexual
autonomy, no matter how salient that value is in modem scholarly discussions.
A robust approach to understanding rape law as outlined in the next Part, while
not a panacea, offers flexibility in the face of fundamental inconsistencies in
modem statutes and their applications.
II. RAPE LAW'S FOUNDATIONS
While the riddle frames his article, Rubenfeld's contentions about the
foundations of rape law are far more significant. Rubenfeld's descriptions of
rape law and rape law scholarship call into question the nature and purposes of
sexual violence law reforms over the last forty years. He reduces rape law to a
single value and overlooks discussion of the scholarship and law contrary to his
thesis. For those reasons, it is far more important to engage Rubenfeld's flawed
arguments about fundamental issues of rape law than to debate the possible
inconsistency in doctrine created by the rape-by-deception-riddle.
A. Rape Is Not a Simple Battery
Rubenfeld's first major mistake in discussing the foundations of rape law is
to contend that sexual autonomy is the sole, untenable foundation for modem
rape law theory offered by scholars and courts. 76 He argues that sexual
autonomy cannot persuasively act as the singular foundational principle of rape
law because it is entirely "irrelevant" to the subject.77 To illustrate the failings
of autonomy theory, Rubenfeld follows a line of investigation focused on
differentiating rape from assault and/or battery:
An unanswered question lies at the heart of rape law. Why is rape a
crime of its own? Every rape is an assault or battery. Every rapist
could be punished on that ground alone. The law, however, does not
treat rape that way. Rape law makes an assault involving particular
body parts a special crime of its own. . . . The crime of rape is in this
respect unique. There is, for example, no special crime of assaulting
75. SCHULHOFER, supra note 54, at 17 ("Social attitudes are tenacious, and they can easily nullify
the theories and doctrines found in the law books. The story of failed [rape law] reforms is in part a story
about the overriding importance of culture, about the seeming irrelevance of law.").
76. One of the difficulties in reading Rubenfeld's article is that he has a tendency to state
conclusions attributed to pronouns with ambiguous references. For example, in the introduction, he
writes that "[t]he problem is that we ought to think it is rape, and courts ought to so hold, given what we
say rape is." Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1376. In neither usage of "we" is it clear who "we" represents.
As a result, to be fair to Rubenfeld, I have tried to include quotations of Rubenfeld's arguments when his
meaning might be ambiguous.
77. Id. at 1424-25.
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someone's hands or face. Nor is there a general crime of penetrating
the body. . . . [W]hat is the special violation that rape inflicts? . . . For
now, we are asking how modem rape law explains itself-how rape's
existence as an independent crime, graver than almost any other
78
assault, is explained today.
Rubenfeld's initial argument, that rape is simply assault and/or battery is
not a new one. 79 Michael Davis, most prominently, advocates the idea that rape
should be treated solely as a battery in his 1984 article on the subject.80 Davis
believes that the essence of rape is the battery and physical attack on a person's
body. Notably, Davis further contends that rape is "not a very serious crime,,,81
showing little regard for, or recognition of, the statements of rape victims on
the subject.82 Like Rubenfeld, Davis espouses his theory toward the altar of
doctrinal coherence stating that rape should not be separately codified in order
for criminal law to be "theoretically sound."8 3 Notably, Rubenfeld did not
engage the scholarship contemporaneous with or replying to Davis since he
posited that rape is merely battery.
Battery statutes are very different than modem rape laws in text and
application. For example, in a battery prosecution, a defendant might contend
that she was provoked into an attack or engaged in self-defense. Such
arguments are not colorable in rape cases as rape is not justifiable if provoked
or as an act of self-defense. Similarly, the most common rape trials, where a
victim knows her rapist, normally hinge on mens rea mistakes of consent.
Unless someone is confused as to whether she may have entered a sanctioned
boxing match, such mistakes are virtually unheard of in battery cases.
There is a more basic problem in Rubenfeld's methodology that illustrates
why his aim is misdirected. He posits that rape is just a battery that targets
particular regions of the body. He then asks if there is any reason to displace
that assumption by making rape a separate crime. A difficulty with this path of
scholarly examination is that it applies to any crime of violence. What is
murder but a battery that results in death? Is not an aggravated assault just a
battery that causes serious bodily harm? Assault with a deadly weapon? That is
simply a battery with a particular means of harm. Why do we treat assault or
battery of a law enforcement officer differently? Indeed, beyond assault and
battery, one might ask why drug distribution is distinguished from simple
possession or driving under the influence from reckless driving. Further, rape
78. Id. at 1387, 1392.
79. See, e.g., Michael Davis, Setting Penalties: What Does Rape Deserve, 3 LAW & PHIL. 61, 62-63
(1984) (contending that rape should be prosecuted "as a variety of ordinary (simple or aggravated)
battery because that is what rape is.").
80. Id.
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brings risks of pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases that do not exist in
battery cases.
The line of questioning used by Rubenfeld itself adds little to the debate
and ultimately distracts from the obvious point that rape, as any rape victim can
attest, is different than assault and battery (just as someone shot in the leg can
explain why a bullet is different than a fist punch). There is still substantial
value in exploring the foundational concepts differentiating each crime, but the
particular method of inquiry used by Rubenfeld is of dubious utility.
Perhaps recognizing the difficulties with his question, Rubenfeld
acknowledges that his investigation might "seem deliberately obtuse or
wantonly insensible." 84 However, the misapprehension with Rubenfeld's
question is not, as he suspects, that it pertains to a highly sensitive topic that
scholars, activists, and victims would rather not discuss. Rather, the reason his
question is particularly problematic is that he boldly asserts that it has remained
"unanswered" like a missing piece of rape law theory that has been ignored for
generations. In contrast to Rubenfeld's claim, modern rape law theorists are not
squeamishly clutching their metaphorical pearls and avoiding fundamental
issues of rape law. Rather, the question that he asks has been addressed over
and over again by a wide range of authors. Scholars, courts, and activists have
articulated three major justifications, other than autonomy, for treating rape
differently than ordinary batteries or other crimes: harm, gender, and terror. 86
1. Rape's Harms
Rape causes greater and different harm than ordinary batteries. Rape is not
merely an attack on the body, but a violation of the psyche of an individual.8 7
84. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1387.
85. In case of confusion on my metaphor, I am referencing a rhetorical move commonly used on
feminist blogs. The feminist authors criticize arguments that assume feminists are too squeamish or
delicate to engage in substantive discussion about the issue debated by referencing "pearl clutching."
The idea is that women clutch their pearl necklaces in shock or horror at what is being stated. This is, of
course, a misogynist assumption that feminists and women are incapable of "real" discussion about
tough issues (especially when the conversation involves so-called "women's issues"). Rubenfeld's
statement appears to support such an assumption in the way he characterizes that his argument might
appear "deliberately obtuse or wantonly insensible." Id. For more discussion of the growing use of the
"pearl clutching" metaphor more broadly, see Torie Bosch, A Plague of Pearl Clutching: How Clutch
the Pearls Became a Lady Blogosphere Cliche, SLATE (Jan. 20, 2012, 11:26 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/doublex/doublex/2012/01 /pearlclutchinghowthe phrase became_a_f
eminist blogclich_.html.
86. Throughout this subpart of the Article, I make heavy use of quotes. I do this for two reasons.
First, in addition to arguing for the substantive claims made in the quotes, I want to clearly counter
Rubenfeld's position that scholars have left "unanswered" the question of why rape is separately
codified. Second, in many cases, I believe that quotes about the experience of rape are important to give
appropriate weight and voice to victims.
87. DRESSLER, supra note 38, at 581 ("[R]ape surely involves more than bruises or breaks to the




Susan Brownmiller rightfully explains how rape is degrading and humiliating
to victims, not because of outdated sexual mores, but because of the inherent
sexual domination of the act. Studies repeatedly show that rape victims have
substantially higher risks of physiological and psychological effects including
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and suicide. 90 Robin West
persuasively contends that the experience of individualized terror combines
with the physical pain to make rape distinctive.91 Rape victims are also
stigmatized in a manner quite different than the treatment given to other crime
victims. One rape counselor explained how social sanctions isolate rape
victims:
Rape is different from other crimes and should be treated differently. .
. . Face it, [rape] isn't the same as having your wallet stolen. If you're
the victim of a theft or mugging, no one will look at you cross-eyed
88. There is an ongoing discussion as to whether "rape victim" or "rape survivor" is the most
appropriate label for those persons who were raped. David Mills, Semantics of Rape Language vs.
What's "Politically Correct, " WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1991, at B5. The argument against using the word
"victim" is primarily because the passivity of the word is disempowering. EDWARD W. GONDoLF &
ELLEN R. FISHER, BATTERED WOMEN AS SURVIVORS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TREATING LEARNED
HELPLESSNESS 17-18 (1988); Evelyn Mary Aswad, Torture by Means of Rape, 84 GEO. L.J. 1913, 1916
n. II (1996); Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and the
Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1311 n. 115 (1992). "Survivor" is a preferred term for
many people because it indicates that the person who was raped had moved past the trauma of the
experience of rape. See, e.g., Rhona Dowdeswell, Why I Must Forgive to Get Over My Rape; Analysis,
W. DAILY PRESS, Jan. 25, 2002, at 8. In contrast, Andrea Dworkin offers perhaps the strongest defense
of using the word "victim" in this context:
It's a true word. If you were raped, you were victimized. You damned well were. You were a
victim. It doesn't mean you are a victim in the metaphysical sense, in your state of being, as
an intrinsic part of your essence and existence. It means somebody hurt you. They injured
you.... And if it happens to you systematically because you are born a woman, it means that
you live in a political system that uses pain and humiliation to control and to hurt you.
Andrea Dworkin, Woman-Hating Right and Left, in THE SEXUAL LIBERALS AND THE ATTACK ON
FEMINISM 28, 38 (Dorchen Leidholdt & Janice G. Raymond eds., 1990). Similar to Dworkin, some
people who have been raped prefer "victim" because they feel that it better reflects their experiences.
Kate E. Bloch, A Rape Law Pedagogy, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307, 308 n.6 (1995). I ultimately decide
to use "victim" because of those persuasive arguments but recognize that my choice might be
objectionable to some.
89. See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 376-78 (1975). Rubenfeld is largely dismissive
of the unique psychological and physiological harms associated with rape because he associates them
entirely with sexual mores of a bygone era. That response is ultimately unpersuasive because of the
numerous studies cited herein which explore the effects unassociated with what Rubenfeld refers to as
defilement harms. Further, even accepting Rubenfeld's argument that all of the harms described here are
a relic of Victorian sensibilities, such harms are still a reality for victims. Simply saying that the world
should move past such concerns does nothing to address the incredible damage suffered by rape victims.
This, of course, is not to say that we should make the mistake of assuming the worst and rhetorically
escalate the described harms. Rather, I am just calling for truth in harm.
90. Tanyika Brime, We Can Do Better: The State of Custodial Misconduct by Correctional Staff in
New York, 15 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 303, 324 (2009); Carlo Faravelli et al., Psychopathology After
Rape, 161 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1483, 1483-84 (2004) (finding that rape victims had significantly higher
risks of PTSD related psychological conditions than other victims of violent crimes).
91. ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 102 (1997) ("[T]his coupling of unwanted and painful
sexual penetration with the experience of terror . . . is the most gender-specific aspect of the experience
of rape.").
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and blame you, ask you what you were doing in that part of town, or
why you were wearing tight clothes, or what you did to deserve it.92
Courts, which have not been a particularly progressive force in rape law,
have long recognized that the severity of harms justifies separate treatment of
rape. For example, over thirty years ago, the New York Court of Appeals
wrote: "The fact that rape statutes exist, however, is a recognition that the harm
caused by a forcible rape is different, and more severe, than the harm caused by
an ordinary assault." 93 Illustrating the very unusual long-term effects of rape,
many rape victims annually recognize the anniversaries of their rapes because
of the disjunction in their life that resulted from the attack.94 It is the higher
level and distinct nature of harm, including but not limited to the violation of
autonomy, which serve as the primary basis for codifying rape as a separate
crime in modem America. 95
Rubenfeld's response to rape's unique harms is disconcerting. He classifies
all of the related physical and psychic harms of rape as solely the product of
outdated sexual puritanism.96 In particular, he contends that victim shame from
those ancient social mores of female defilement account for why modem
victims experience greater harm from rape. 97 He ultimately concludes that self-
possession theory is the only explanation for why rape is worse because it
encapsulates the "helplessness, fear, and pain" experienced by rape victims. 98
92. Shann Nix, Debate over Naming Rape Victims, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 18, 1991, at Al (quoting K.
Kaufman).
93. People v. Liberia, 474 N.E.2d 567, 574 (N.Y. 1984).
94. Martha Chamallas, Gender, Law, and Narrative: Lucky: The Sequel, 80 IND. L.J. 441, 468
(2005) ("The significance of rape in the lives of its victims can be seen by the fact that many survivors
take special note of the 'anniversary' of their rape.").
95. ARNOLD H. LOEWY, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2009) ("The fact that rape
statutes exist, however, is a recognition that the harm caused by forcible rape is different, and more
severe, than the harm caused by ordinary assault.").
96. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1388-92. Rubenfeld argues that modem law replicates what he
refers to as "traditional" application of rape law in focusing on sexual defilement:
Why then, for traditional judges, was rape so vile and so different from other assaults? The
answer would have been simple: rape defiled women. . . . Traditional rape law's picture of
female purity is too well known to require much spelling out. Yet the connection between the
old morality and some of rape law's basic doctrines has been surprisingly underappreciated.
Id. at 1388-89.
97. Rubenfeld writes:
Rape was ruin, and sex did not ruin men. The "utmost resistance requirement" also fit
comfortably with the traditional view, as a test of whether women displayed the virtue that
rape law existed to protect. . . . Similarly, traditional rape law was notoriously hostile to
claims by "fallen" women. Officially, the victim's past unchastity was irrelevant. But a
woman's past sexual derelictions could still be put before the jury to show consent. Modern
critics excoriate this doctrine, arguing that it allowed rapists to be acquitted because their
victims were sexually active. This criticism is completely justified, but what it criticizes was
the doctrine's very point: tacitly, if not explicitly, (male) juries understood that rape was a
crime of defilement-and how could sex defile a woman who had no virtue to defile?
Id. at 1391-1392 (internal citations omitted.).
98. Id. at 1430.
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It is this last point that illustrates how Rubenfeld's argument defeats itself.
He starts by saying the only explanation scholars and courts give for rape being
different than battery is the violation of autonomy (ignoring the utilitarian
harms that have been documented for decades). Next, he states that the fear and
pain experienced by rape victims is due to the legacy of sexual defilement
norms. He then concludes that self-possession theory is superior because it
explains the harms ("helplessness, fear, and pain") that he ignores in his initial
claim and dismisses as explainable by negative cultural norms in his second
point. By recognizing the very harms he earlier ignores and dismisses, he ends
up articulating a basis separate than autonomy theory for rape law.
Regardless of the tension in his argument, the much larger problem with
Rubenfeld's account of rape harms is that he misunderstands the history of
sexual defilement morality. Rubenfeld's story is that rape was considered a
separate crime in early America because of a "simple" reason: "rape defiled
women."99 He so concludes because he takes the judges of the time at their
word that the motivation for punishing rape was to protect women.'oo
Rubenfeld's narrative is contrary to the well-documented history, in many
of the sources he cites and discusses, that defilement of White women was only
a concern to the male legislators and judges because rape of a woman
amounted to destruction of male property. 0 1 When White women were raped,
courts cared that they were ruined not because of empathy or humanity, but
because such women were no longer considered worth marrying. 102 Without
virginity, prospective wives were deemed worthless whether the virginity was
given consensually or taken against their will. 1 0 3 Rubenfeld dances around this
distinction when he recognizes the role of women-as-property in discussing the
marital rape exception, but misses the mark in providing an accurate history of
why rape was criminalized into the twentieth century.
The reason for my focusing on defilement of White women in the previous
paragraph is that it is virtually impossible to discuss rape law history without
also addressing the disparate treatment of both Black victims and alleged
rapists. And yet, Rubenfeld's history of rape law's focus on female defilement
is oddly silent on the subject of race.104 Indeed, Rubenfeld refers to a universal
99. Id. at 1388, 1391. Rubenfeld's claim that "[lr]ape as a crime against female virtue explains other
definitive features of traditional doctrine" such as rape formerly being a crime that could only be
committed against women.
100. Id. at 1388-1389. See also id. at 1391 ("Rape was ruin, and sex did not ruin men.").
101. Zanita E. Fenton, An Essay on Slavery's Hidden Legacy: Social Hysteria and Structural
Condonation of Incest, 55 How. L.J. 319, 331 (2012) ("Rape for white women was originally offense
trespass against the property interest of the father or husband as owner of the woman violated.").
102. Steven F. Shatz & Naomi R. Shatz, Chivalry Is Not Dead: Murder, Gender, and the Death
Penalty, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 64, 102 (2012).
103. Id.
104. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1388-92 (discussing the historical reasoning for punishing rape
based upon female defilement).
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"woman" in discussing why rape was punished in much of American history. 05
However, the truth for Black women and other women of color victims was far
different. Before the civil war, Black women, even those who had been "freed,"
were sexually victimized with little concern by prosecutors for their
defilement. 106 Even well into the twentieth century, Black women were not
recognized as rape victims because they were perceived as overly promiscuous
and not capable of being defiled. 107
Similarly, the fear of female defilement through rape was largely
constructed against myths about wild Black men terrorizing White women. The
Black beasts narrative has long dominated rape law and was famously
exemplified in trials of the "Scottsboro Boys" in the 1930s, where in which
Black teenagers in the South were wrongfully convicted for rape and sentenced
to death.1os The death penalty for rape was largely derived from lynchings of
Blacks in southern states and almost never applied to White defendants.1 09 The
story of rape as defilement that Rubenfeld tells simply whitewashes the ugly
racial dynamics that shaped rape law through most of American history.
In this case, the historical difference matters quite a bit. When rape was
punished as a defilement of male property, the woman victim was left out of
the equation. In contrast, in modem America, the psychic, traumatic, and
physical injuries of rape victims are understood differently because the
punishment of the rapist is inflicted in retribution for the harm to the victims
(and not their dear husbands)."1 0 The trauma of a rape victim can no more be
dismissed as Victorian Apocrypha imported into modernity than a soldier's
105. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1388 ("[R]ape defiled women. No injury to a woman
short of death, and perhaps not even death, was worse than rape. . . . To rape was to shame and
dishonour a woman. Or in the sympathetic phrase of a seventeenth-century digest compiled for the
governance of the New World, to rape a woman was to make a whore of her.") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
106. Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape as a Badge of Slavery: The Legal History of and Remedies for,
Prosecutorial Race-of- Victim Charging Disparities, 7 NEV. L.J. 1, 7-8 (2006) ("The history of rape
prosecution has always been inextricably intertwined with the history of race relations in this county....
Raping a Black woman was not a crime for the majority of this Nation's history. First, the rape of a
Black woman was simply not criminalized. And even when there was an argument that a statute was
race neutral as to victimization, prosecutorial inaction and Court holdings made clear the lack of
recourse for Black women who were raped.").
107. Id. at 22-23 ("Although the laws no longer defined crimes and punishments by race of victim
and race of offender, those with the discretionary power to wield the law-police, prosecutors and
judges-mostly acted as if nothing had changed. . . . This resulted in the stark continuation of the two-
pronged gendered racism in criminal prosecution and punishments for rape.... Black men and women
were still considered sexually promiscuous in a way that allegedly endangered White women and made
rape of a Black woman legally impossible. . . . Similarly, no Black woman was presumed virginal or
chaste and was therefore presumed promiscuous.").
108. TASLITZ,supra note 61, 29-30.
109. Carol S. Steiker, Remembering Race, Rape, and Capital Punishment, 83 VA. L. REV. 693, 699
(1997).
110. This is not to discount the ongoing role of patriarchy and misogyny in rape law. Rather, I only




post-traumatic stress disorder can be attributed to the violence of the Middle
Ages in Western Europe.
The unique harms experienced by rape victims are understood without a
theory of self-possession because those victims articulate their pain and
suffering and should not have it summarily dismissed as a historical relic of a
bygone age. Further, self-possession theory is especially tone-deaf in this
regard because it ultimately discounts the harms suffered by the large majority
of rape victims by only recognizing rapes with an excessive amount of force
used."'
2. Rape and Gender
Rape is different than other assaults and personal violations because it is
inextricably intertwined with gender and patriarchy. Rape is a heavily gendered
crime whose perpetrators are almost exclusively male and victims, outside of
prison, are overwhelmingly female.112 This is not to deny or diminish rape
involving other gender combinations, including male-male, female-female, or
female-male. Rather, it is a simple statement about how gender explains and
potentially justifies rape's unique status in American law. As Susan Estrich
states in her classic book Real Rape: "Rape is different from assault. . . .
Ignoring these differences allows the exclusion of the simple 'technical' rape
from the working definition of the crime to appear neutral, when it is not." 11 3
Much like modern hate crime statutes, rape laws are justified as attempts to
prevent and punish a crime of gendered violence. 114
It is surprising how gender is largely missing from Rubenfeld's article.
There are obviously references to men and women. But discussions of feminist
theories of patriarchy or systemic biases against women are largely omitted. 1 5
He regularly cites and discusses feminist scholars who created the backbone of
modern rape law theory, but leaves out gender-conscious portions of their
arguments. This gender blind-spot helps to explain why Rubenfeld focuses
exclusively on universal (gender-neutral) theories of autonomy and self-
possession. Rubenfeld simply fails to recognize how social misogyny provides
a foundational value for separate codification of rape law.
However, it is important to note the significant recent work that I. Bennett
Capers is doing in describing how the rhetoric that rape is different because of
111. See infra Part Ill.A.
112. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 383 (1992).
113. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 21 (1987).
114. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 598 (1996) ("A
rape, for example, is often more reprehensible than an ordinary assault-even if the assault results in
greater physical injury-because the violation of a woman's sexual autonomy conveys greater disrespect
for her worth than do most other violations of her person.").
115. The words "patriarchy" and "patriarchal" are absent entirely from his article, which is
especially striking in an article that discusses so much history of rape law.
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its gendered qualities is used to support rules and laws of questionable value.116
He ultimately concludes that having unique evidentiary rules for rape because
of gender concerns undermines feminism and gender equality.17 While
Capers's contentions warrant a thoughtful response, they do not call into
question the idea that rape law is justified, in a descriptive sense, by gender
concerns. As a result, Capers's claims are inapposite to the difficulties with
Rubenfeld's argument. Rubenfeld is focused solely on the question of
substantive law of justifying why rape should be codified separately. In
contrast, Capers is concerned with the procedural and evidentiary
accommodations that have been made for rape cases because of gender
concerns. There is no inherent tension between contending that rape, because of
gender dynamics, should be a separate substantive offense but should have no
distinct procedural or evidentiary rules.
3. Rape and Terror
Related to the gender dynamics issue, rape is different because it creates an
atmosphere of terror in the face of widespread sexual violence. Catherine
MacKinnon famously explains the unique terror effects of rape when she
writes: "[A] rape is not an isolated event or moral transgression or individual
interchange gone wrong but an act of terrorism and torture within a systemic
context of group subjection, like lynching." Elizabeth Stanko similarly writes
that: "To be a woman . . . is to experience physical and/or sexual terrorism at
the hands of men . . . . We are wary of going out at night, even in our own
neighbourhoods." 19
Studies have long documented how the fear of rape substantially alters the
decisions people make in their daily lives.120 Alexandra Wald finds that women
are less likely to enter or stay in the public sphere because of the fear of sexual
violence. 121 Robin West observes how women often try to escape the terror
inflicted by rape by seeking protective men, who often end up representing the
116. 1. Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1307 (2011) ("These special rules
exist in part because feminists have long argued that rape is different because of gender. But rape is not
different because of gender. If the goal of feminism is to undo gender, rape reforms have undermined
that goal at every turn.").
117. 1. Bennett Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, 60 UCLA L. REv. 826, 832 (2013).
118. CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 172 (1989).
119. ELIZABETH A. STANKO, INTIMATE INTRUSIONS 9 (1989).
120. SCHULHOFER, supra note 54, at 49 ("68 percent of the men but only 39 percent of the women
said that they felt reasonably safe [in their own neighborhoods at night] . . . 68 percent of women but
only 5 percent of men say that they won't go to bars or clubs alone after dark. . . . More than 80 percent
of women report that they sometimes drive rather than walk because of fear of being harmed and
sometimes go somewhere with a friend just for protection . . . .").
121. Alexandra Wald, What's Rightfully Ours: Toward a Property Theory of Rape, 30 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 459, 492-93 (1997).
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very danger that women are trying to escape.122 The net result of the terror
inflicted upon women by rape is that they bear, as a class, a unique social
burden. Those collateral terror effects make the status of rape quite different
than ordinary batteries because even persons who are not directly victimized by
rapes are secondary victims.
Rubenfeld fails to recognize how the pattern of sexual violence creates
harms that differentiate rape as a crime. Further, he is simply wrong that his
question concerning why rape should be codified as an independent offense has
gone unanswered. He misses the overwhelming bulk of the relevant literature in
reaching this conclusion and misreads the cases in the general sphere of sex
laws. He, of course, would be free to argue that his self-possession theory is
still a better basis for rape law than existing justifications (a position I discuss
later). However, his failure to engage the larger scholarship that properly offers
a foundation for rape laws renders his theory of a right to self-possession a
solution in search of a problem.
B. (Mis) understanding Sexual Autonomy
Given the breadth and depth of writings describing alternate justifications
for rape statutes, why does Rubenfeld fixate on autonomy as the sole
foundation for modem rape laws? Rubenfeld's mistaken focus seems to be
based upon a misreading of rape law scholarship and court cases. His failure to
appreciate the way rape law scholars write about autonomy is likely due to the
unusual dynamics of autonomy in a mutual activity such as sex. Ultimately,
Rubenfeld seems quite comfortable in discussing classic philosophical texts on
general human autonomy theory, but is out of his element in recognizing why
sexual autonomy is inherently different.
1. Asexual Autonomy
Rubenfeld offers many ideas and beliefs about autonomy, but precious few
are helpful or applicable in differentiating rape from consensual sex. Indeed,
Rubenfeld so misunderstands how concepts related to sexual autonomy are
different than a general autonomy principle, that he views autonomy as
fundamentally at odds with sexuality.123 He posits this convoluted metaphor to
illustrate his incommensurability argument: "Bringing autonomy to sexuality is
122. Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives, 3 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 104
(1987).
123. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1422 ("Individual autonomy is the last thing sexuality wants. From
autonomy's point of view, sexuality is undesirable. From sexuality's, autonomy is.").
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like offering hunger the freedom to drink as much water as it likes, at whatever
temperature it chooses." 24
The primary factor in separating sexual autonomy from other forms of self-
determination is that sex, at least the sex that can be part of a rape, requires
more than one person. Whereas autonomy for a solo activity might imply
uninhibited freedom, sexual autonomy has built-in limits. Rubenfeld simply
ignores this fundamental distinction and treats sexual autonomy as a libertarian
concept of unbounded choice.
Rubenfeld uses his idiosyncratic view of sexual autonomy to make his
arguments viable. For example, in discussing the impossibility of sexual
autonomy, Rubenfeld creates a strawman argument by defining autonomy in
terms that no actual rape law scholar supports:
For many, sexual autonomy means sexual "self-determination" ....
But guaranteeing everyone a right to sexual "self-determination" is
quite impossible. . . . [O]ne person's sexual self-determination will
inevitably conflict with others': John's will require that he sleep with
Jane, but Jane's will require otherwise.125
That example is nonsense. No one except Rubenfeld defines an
individual's sexual autonomy as giving a person license to rape another.
Stephen Schulhofer is perhaps the scholar who has offered the richest account
of sexual autonomy in regards to rape law and his work is discussed in
Rubenfeld's article.126 Schulhofer defines sexual autonomy as the exercise of a
basic right to choose with whom we have sexual relations.127 He contrasts
autonomy with coercion and concludes that autonomy ends where coercion
begins.128 Rubenfeld simply offers his own view of autonomy, with no basis in
the rape law literature, and then knocks it down. He is arguing only with
himself.
Rubenfeld only superficially engages rape law scholars and judges who
have issued relevant opinions in defining sexual autonomy and assessing its
role in modem rape law theory. For example, among scholars that he discusses,
Rubenfeld does not appreciate or articulate the context of the work of scholars
such as Patricia Falk and Schulhofer who argue that autonomy is a fundamental
principle for defining sexual consent.129 In the portions of their work cited,
Schulhofer and Falk are normatively contending that the word "consent" in
124. Rubenfeld, supra note 27, at 392.
125. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1418.
126. Id. at 1394.
127. SCHULHOFER, supra note 54, at 144-45.
128. Id.
129. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1394.
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modem rape statutes should be understood through the autonomy paradigm.' 30
Rubenfeld's argument is operating on a different, more basic level. Schulhofer
and Falk are not seeking to justify the codification of rape as a distinct crime
solely via sexual autonomy (although they would likely contend that it is one of
many justifications for distinct rape law). Rather, the focus of their scholarship
is assuming such codification and arguing how the consent element should be
understood by supporting a strong notion of sexual autonomy.
Similarly, Rubenfeld reads far too much into this single quote from the
majority opinion in the Supreme Court's decision in Coker v. Georgia. In the
text cited by Rubenfeld, the Court writes that:
We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is highly
reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt
for the personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim and for
the latter's privilege of choosing those with whom intimate
relationships are to be established. Short of homicide, it is the ultimate
violation of self.1 3 1
Nowhere does the Court contend that autonomy, to the exclusion of other
principles, explains the severity of rape and why the crime is not treated as an
assault. The Court is simply trying to address concerns that its holding-that
the death penalty could not constitutionally be applied to the crime of rape-
does not minimize rape. Further, the Coker opinion is simply too dated to be
130. The citation to Schulhofer is clear in this regard. SCHULHOFER, supra note 54, at 99-113.
Within the text, Rubenfeld recognizes the limited nature of Scholhofer's claim when Rubenfeld only
notes that "Stephen Schulhofer has argued extensively in favor of 'sexual autonomy' and the 'right to
sexual self-determination."' Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1394 (citing STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER,
UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 19-20 (1998)). This claim
is far different than Rubenfeld's belief that autonomy is the underlying principle for the separate
codification of rape.
The quote Rubenfeld uses from Falk is more ambiguous and may have created some of the confusion.
Falk contends that "[T]he central value protected by sexual offense provisions is sexual autonomy or
sexual integrity, the violation of which represents a unique, not readily comparable, type of harm to the
victim." Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Drugs: A Statutory Overview and Proposals for Reform, 44 ARIZ. L.
REV. 131, 187 (2002). Taken alone, this quotation would seem to give credence to Rubenfeld's claim
that sexual autonomy is the critical basis for rape law. However, the sentence appears in the context of
Falk discussing the concept of consent in cases where the victims are subject to "force, threat, coercion,
power, fraud, or drugs." Id. The fairer reading of the text is that when Falk identified the "central value
protected by sexual offense provisions" she means the consent element specifically and not the central
value of sexual offense provisions generally. Regardless, Rubenfeld simply misses the alternative claims
of rape's special status in large swaths of scholarship previously discussed herein (and cited by
Rubenfeld in many instances).
131. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Indeed, it was only two years previous to the Court's decision in Coker that Michigan became the first
state to amend its rape laws to reflect some of the concerns of feminists. SCHULHOFER, supra note 54, at
29.
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relevant because it was issued in 1977, well before almost all of modem rape
law scholarship was published.132
Perhaps the oddest step in Rubenfeld's analysis is his treatment of the
Supreme Court's 2003 opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, ruling the Texas anti-
sodomy statute unconstitutional.133 To be fair, the majority opinion in
Lawrence is not a model of clarity.134 The exact contours of the so-called
Lawrence right are poorly elucidated and, as a result, difficult for other courts
to apply in a consistent manner. Nonetheless, whatever Lawrence does mean,
the decision conceives of autonomy as a shield protecting an individual's
sexual liberty from government prosecution.136 After Lawrence, adult
Americans, in private, are thought to be free to engage in non-commercial
sodomy.
In contrast, Rubenfeld, in portions of his article, views Lawrence as
embodying the notion that sexual autonomy is a sword such that any violation
of that autonomy is criminal. In particular, Rubenfeld claims that if rape law
does not recognize rape-by-deception as rape, which it currently does not, then
the Lawrence decision is "rebuke[d]" and the right to sexual autonomy
described in the opinion is violated. 37 He further contends that Lawrence
would have to be "reconsidered" if the right to sexual autonomy is not the
fundamental component of rape law.' 38
132. Rubenfeld also cites the well-known New Jersey case of State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266,
1278 (N.J. 1992). M.T.S. is even less relevant than the language used in Coker. Many at the time of the
decision thought that M.T.S. represented a new direction in understanding consent such that a person
would require affirmative consent before initiating a sex act. However, the decision has largely been
ignored in the general rape cases because of the special circumstances in the matter. The case involved
two juveniles in a controlled institutional setting. Later courts have so limited the holding in M.T.S. to
analogous situations. SCHULHOFER, supra note 54, at 97-98. Further, the M.T.S. opinion is not
addressing the fundamental question as to why rape is differentiated from ordinary assault. It is simply
trying to untangle the law of consent, which was in flux at the time.
133. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
134. Cecil VanDevender, How Self-Restriction Laws Can Influence Societal Norms and Address
Problems ofBounded Rationality, 96 GEO. L.J. 1775, 1802 (2008).
135. James Allon Garland, Sexual Expression: Sex as a Form of Gender and Expression after
Lawrence v. Texas, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 297, 307 (2006) ("As the scholarly debate over its
meaning attests, Lawrence's lack of clarity about the nature of the right it recognized may already be
promoting its narrowing.").
136. Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 98 (2003).
137. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1409 ("If Lawrence really holds that every individual has a right to
sexual autonomy, rape law's permission of sex-by-deception-permitting private actors to deceive
people into sex-would be analogous to a statute permitting private actors to deceive women into
childbirth. It would be a rebuke to Lawrence. It would allow private actors to deny or obstruct a freedom
that constitutional law had deemed fundamental.").
138. Id. at 1413 ("One of them has to give. Perhaps sex-by-deception should be rape-or at any
rate a crime-in which case our criminal sex law could and should embrace sexual autonomy without
cavil. Or perhaps instead the supposed right to sexual autonomy is wrong, in which case rejecting rape-
by-deception is much less problematic, but Lawrence v. Texas, to the extent that it stands for such a
right, would have to be reconsidered.").
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Rubenfeld's view of Lawrence is unsupportable. The right to sexual
autonomy, as conceived of in Lawrence, is only a protection from government
punishment of consensual sexual activity. Private actors who violate other
people's sexual autonomy do not abridge that right under current law. If
Rubenfeld wants to argue for a stronger view of autonomy (which would be
antithetical to his claim that the right to sexual autonomy is useless in rape
law), then he is free to do so. However, to argue that the Lawrence right under
current doctrine is "obstruct[ed] or den[ied]" when a rape occurs is beyond any
reasonable reading of the Court's opinion.1 39
Indeed, the difficulty with Rubenfeld's Lawrence discussion perhaps
highlights that his discussion of "rights" (the right to sexual autonomy versus
the right to self-possession) is inappropriate in the context of substantive
criminal law. The criminal code is filled with hundreds of crimes that do not
reflect fundamental rights violations such as drug possession, loitering, or
prostitution. Indeed, it is often fundamental rights that curb the scope of
criminal laws as in the cases of sedition laws (limited by the First Amendment),
retroactive punishment (limited by the Ex Post Facto Clause), and weapon
possession statutes (limited by the Second Amendment). Rape law might
protect sexual autonomy, but there is simply nothing gained by characterizing
the discussion as involving the constitutional right articulated in Lawrence.
2. Smoking and Sex
As a result of his odd conception of sexual autonomy, Rubenfeld concludes
that autonomy should be discarded from rape law as it is "irrelevant." 140 To
make that strong claim, he relies on a single, bizarre hypothetical example.
Rather than summarize Rubenfeld's argument, and have you, the reader, think
that I have potentially misstated it, I include it here in its entirety:
In fact, sexual autonomy is a red herring when it comes to rape. Seeing
why will point the way to an alternative principle. Imagine two friends
debating whether individuals have a fundamental right of "smoking
autonomy" (meaning something like a right to smoke if and as one
chooses). John, a cigar smoker, claims there is such a right. Jane, a
nonsmoker, denies it. John says smoking is central to and expressive of
his identity; Jane says no one has a right to inflict on others unpleasant
and perhaps harmful smoke. In a subtle parry of Jane's nuanced logic,
John physically forces her to smoke the cigar against her will.
139. Id. at 1409.
140. Id. at 1424-25.
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Now: are we obliged to say that Jane was wrong-that there is a right
of "smoking autonomy"-in order to conclude that she had a right not
to have a cigar stuffed into her mouth? I don't think so. What makes
John's act wrongful has nothing to do with whether it violated Jane's
supposed right of "smoking autonomy"-a concept we might want to
reject altogether. In other words, "smoking autonomy" is wholly
irrelevant to the wrongness of John's act.
So too with "sexual autonomy" and rape. No one needs to believe in
"sexual autonomy" to be against rape. Sexual autonomy is irrelevant to
rape law.141
The analogy between smoking and sexual autonomy is not just strained; it
is simply wrong. There are significant ways that the activities of smoking and
consensual sex are radically different.
The problems with Rubenfeld's analogy can be boiled down to, at a
minimum, three objections. First, smoking has deleterious effects on persons
not partaking in the activity through second-hand smoke. When Jane in
Rubenfeld's example asserts her right not to have her air polluted, she is not
just arguing against forcible smoking-she is saying that John does not have a
right to contaminate her air through second-hand smoke without her consent.
Jane has a competing right in preserving her health and second-hand smoke
violates that right. This is the nature of rights and autonomy in a modem liberal
society wherein conflicts between rights and autonomy inevitably lead to
constraints without abandoning the conflicting rights or autonomy entirely. In
contrast, private consensual sex represents neither danger to other parties nor a
rights conflict.
Second, Rubenfeld conflates necessary and sufficient conditions. He is
quite right to assert that "[n]o one needs to believe in 'sexual autonomy' to be
against rape." As discussed in Part II.A, there are other bases for someone to
object to rape: harm caused, gendered impacts, and terrorization. Autonomy,
however, is a potentially strong sufficient condition to argue that rape is wrong.
Simply arguing, as Rubenfeld does, that autonomy is not a necessary condition
does nothing to establish it is "irrelevant" to rape law.
Third, the nature and numbers of persons involved in smoking and sex
differ. Smoking is a solitary activity. As discussed earlier in this Part, sex, at
least the type of sex that can turn into rape if there is no consent, involves more
than one person. Protecting so-called "smoking autonomy" merely means
allowing a single person to smoke (limited only by method or location so that
other persons are not negatively impacted). In contrast, sexual autonomy




It means giving each person a right to say "yes" and "no." The right is
necessarily different because it involves protecting an interaction between at
least two persons instead of one person and an inanimate object.
3. Sexual Theft and Autonomy
One of the interrelated reasons that Rubenfeld misreads the literature on
sexual autonomy is because of his focus on the crime of battery. The general
project of comparing the legal definition of rape to other criminal statutes, such
as battery, is valuable. In particular, such comparisons help to clarify what is
similar and dissimilar about rape law. However, Rubenfeld's exclusive focus
on battery misses the far more helpful analogy used to analyze rape-the crime
of theft. It is through the discussion of theft law that a richer picture of sexual
autonomy emerges.
Despite the linguistic similarity between "assault" and "sexual assault,"
scholars find greater connections between the law of theft and rape than assault
and rape. Scholars as diverse as Richard Posner, Robin West, Susan Estrich,
and Donald Dripps recognize that, from a statutory perspective, rape is
essentially the theft of sex.142 Richard Posner is clear about his support for
analyzing rape law via theft prosecutions when he labels rapists as "sex
thie[ves]."l 43 Consistent with his choice of terminology, Posner argues that sex
should be treated as a commodity and rape should be viewed as theft of that
commodity.1 44 Donald Dripps offers a similar, yet distinct, commodity theory
of rape and sexual assault recognizing the linkages between rape and theft
law.145 Robin West, while not fully embracing Dripps's statutory and
theoretical proposal, does ultimately find the theft analogy helpful in studying
and explaining rape law. 146 Susan Estrich, in arguing that consent can be
negated by extortionate threats and misrepresentations of material fact, can also
be read as proposing a similar commodity analysis to address the very concerns
that Rubenfeld is focused on: rape-by-deception.1 47 The focus on battery
(instead of theft) law ultimately leads Rubenfeld astray as he sees force and the
142. Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force
and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1780, 1786-87 (1992); ESTRICH, supra note 113, at
102-03; POSNER, supra note 112, at 182; Robin West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on
Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442, 1447 (1993). See infra Part 1.B.
143. POSNER, supra note 112, at 182.
144. Id. at 182-83.
145. Dripps, supra note 142, at 1805-06.
146. West, supra note 142. West outlines some of the problems with Richard Posner's particular
comparisons between rape and theft law in her review of Sex and Reason. Robin West, Sex, Reason, and
a Taste for the Absurd, 81 GEO. L.J. 2413, 2430-31 (1993).
147. ESTRICH, supra note 113, at 102-03. Unlike Posner and Dripps, Estrich seeks to criminalize
coercive sex situations through using the theft analogy. Id. Unfortunately, unlike Dripps, Estrich does
not detail how the analogy would be put into effect to criminalize coercive sex in the manner that she
desires. SCHULHOFER, supra note 54, at 84.
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physical invasion of the body as the quintessence of rape in crafting his theory
of self-possession.
This is, of course, not to say that rape is theft. Equivocating the two crimes
would repeat the mistake of Rubenfeld contending that rape is merely a type of
battery. Robin West, in particular, in reviewing Posner's work on the subject,
identifies several concerns with the theft-rape analogy.148 West argues that
Posner's commodity theory of rape fell prey to the problem of legitimation.1 49
Because Posner takes a strong view of autonomy, he is unwilling to support any
attempt to criminalize rape by fraud or coercion. West is concerned that the
failure to criminalize coercive sex means that those acts became legitimated by
their legality.15 0 The end result of Posner's silence concerning other crimes is
that society would remain blind to coercive sex acts even when there were
"grossly unequal distributions of sexual power.",' Nonetheless, in her debate
with Dripps about his commodity theory, she ultimately finds value in the use
of the theft analogy for unpacking the patriarchal assumptions of the
application of modem rape law.152
Despite its shortcomings, comparing rape to theft offers insights into why
rape law reform has not been a long-term success because prosecutors, jurors,
judges, and legislators treat rape as a radically different crime justifying special
defendant-friendly rules. In contrast, treating rape as a subset of another crime,
such as a battery, is indefensible because of the unique issues involved with
sexual violence described in Part II.A.
The theft analogy offers numerous benefits for the feminist and rape law
reformer perspective when compared to the traditional definitions adopted by
courts and legislatures. '5 It explains the inappropriateness of the "utmost
resistance standard" and its watered-down variants as no resistance is required
for theft victims. Similarly, evidence of past consensual sexual history of the
victim is irrelevant under the theft analogy just as evidence of charitable giving
by the victim is inadmissible in a theft trial. The commodity theory underlying
the theft analogy puts emphasis on choice, a value fundamental to feminist
theories of rape law.1 54
148. West, supra note 146, at 2430-31.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2431-32.
151. Id. at 2431 (emphasis added).
152. West, supra note 142, at 1447.
153. West, supra note 146, at 2431.
154. See, e.g., id. at 243 1. As with any analogy, there are differences between rape and theft that
are important to note. For example, although Dripps is careful not to adopt a commodity theory that
would "smuggle in a normative term," it is impossible to avoid the inclusion of inherent assumptions
about the nature of commodities. Dripps, supra note 1422, at 1787. In many theft cases, restitution is
possible and a victim can be made whole. Stolen goods can be returned. Even when the stolen objects
have high sentimental value, there is still some measure of fungibility. Dripps recognizes the difficulty
with this portion of the analogy and, accordingly, shifts his discussion from theft of goods to theft of
personal services. Id. at 1801-03. Under this perspective, however, the analogy is still difficult to apply
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The comparison to theft effectively explains how autonomy should be used
to separate a consensual event (charity or gifting) from a non-consensual one
(theft). Gifting, like sex, is a mutual activity such that there must be a giver and
a receiver. If either party chooses not to join in the endeavor then no gifting
occurs. In such cases, the autonomy of each individual does not require the
other party to comply against his will. Someone who wishes to be a receiver
from a giver who does not want to gift stops being a receiver and becomes a
thief. Rubenfeld, in his smoking autonomy analogy, omits the discussion of
how differently autonomy operates when the activity involved requires mutual
consent.
III. SELF-POSSESSION THEORY IS MISGUIDED
Rubenfeld concludes his article by contending that conceiving of rape as a
violation of self-possession akin to torture or slavery offers a better basis for
modem rape law than autonomy theory.' 5 5 He ultimately argues that the right to
self-possession is superior to autonomy theory because it solves the riddle of
rape-by-deception. As I noted earlier, I do not dispute that a right to self-
possession solves the riddle. Rather, I contend that the means by which it
addresses the puzzle is troublesome. 156
A. Self-Possession and Force
By using a very narrow definition of rape based upon a theory of self-
possession, there would be a drastic decrease in the number of rapes that could
be prosecuted. As conceived by Rubenfeld, the right to self-possession
translates into statutory language requiring the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant must commit a sex act, "through the kind
of force that turns labor into slavery: roughly speaking, physical incapacitation,
whether through restraint or imprisonment, or serious physical assault (or the
threat of either)."'57
in certain cases. Unlike most theft of services cases, rape is the taking of a service that is not available in
a consensual manner on the open market. Theft of services is more analogous to a situation of an unpaid
prostitute. Rape is different in part because true compensation for injury is impossible. Despite these
problems, the theft analogy is widely supported for its benefits in exposing the shortcomings of modem
rape law application.
155. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1432-34.
156. One of the oddities of the way Rubenfeld structures his article is that he states quite openly
that the portion of the piece regarding self-possession is bound to be controversial and problematic. Id.
at 1380. He even claims, in his introductory road map, that that portion of the article should not have
been written. Id. ("Parts IV and V of this Article-well, Parts IV and V should probably never have
been written."). Nonetheless, he continues.
157. Id. at 1436.
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The choice of language by Rubenfeld likely indicates that the force
requirement used in many jurisdictions would be far narrower if Rubenfeld's
theory were implemented into law. Consider, for example, how a California
court explained the role of its state's force requirement: "Because the
fundamental wrong is the violation of a woman's will and sexuality, the law of
rape does not require that 'force' cause physical harm. . . . '[F]orce' plays
merely a supporting evidentiary role, as necessary only to insure an act of
intercourse has been undertaken against a victim's will." 15 8  Even the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion in Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, the
most famous case defining a state's force requirement, merely required proof of
"forcible compulsion" to satisfy the requirement. 159
Rubenfeld's force requirement, in contrast, requires far more violence or
threatened violence on behalf of the defendant. He proposes not just ordinary
force, such as a push or slap (or threat of either), be sufficient, but instead says
that the force or threat of force must be of the type and severity used to compel
someone into slavery. It is difficult to imagine that someone would submit to
human bondage without actual or threatened grievous bodily harm. In that way,
Rubenfeld's force requirement is much closer to the outdated "utmost
resistance requirement" than modern force elements. If Rubenfeld's proposed
language is indeed that narrow, then only a handful of rape cases could be
prosecuted in any jurisdiction.
The most charitable interpretation of Rubenfeld's proposed statutory
change (ignoring the connections he makes to torture and slavery) is that he
would have modem rape statutes eliminate the non-consent element and use a
typical force requirement as the means of differentiating sex from rape. If that
is the case, it is unclear what contribution Rubenfeld's article makes to the
relevant literature. The theory underlying the right to self-possession assumes
force of a level to compel torture or slavery. If Rubenfeld is merely contending
that the modem force requirement is sufficient then his novel theory is a
superfluous tangent.160 Further, even assuming that Rubenfeld's statute would
158. People v. Cicero, 157 Cal. App. 3d 465, 475 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
159. 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994) (emphasis added).
160. Despite the tension between this modest proposal and his retheorizing of rape law, Rubenfeld
contends, in response to critics, that he does not support a "rollback" of rape law. He writes: "It's simply
a confusion to think that my account of rape would somehow preclude punishment of these offenses. No
'rollback' of these or other sex offenses is implied by my article." Rubenfeld, supra note 27, at 399.
Given that his original article was a radical criticism of existing rape laws, it is strange now to say that
he does not support any retrenchment of such statutes. Perhaps realizing the serious problems in his
article, Rubenfeld is attempting to rewrite his scholarly history. Ultimately, it is for the reader to decide
if Rubenfeld's attempt to blame others for misreading his work is a sound argument. See supra note 27.
In particular, it seems impossible to reconcile the above statement with this quote from his original
article: "Accordingly, absent physical restraint, overpowering, violence, or the threat of violence, rape as
a violation of self-possession would fail to give 'no' the categorical rape-creating effect a consent-based
conception might give it." Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1440. That prescription undoubtedly represents a




be identical to modem force requirements, it would still have disastrous effects
through imposition of that element in jurisdictions that had removed it.
In his article, Rubenfeld fails to consider the paradigmatic rape scenario
under modem rape law: non-stranger rape.i16 Since the rape law reform
movement, cultural changes have steadily allowed prosecutors to win
convictions in non-stranger rape cases. In such situations, force is rarely used.
Studies and the best available data indicate that such cases now constitute
approximately ninety percent of rapes in the United States.162 Rubenfeld
ignores such instances and his silence is telling in his failure to engage the vast
majority of fact patterns in rape cases.
It is also worth noting that Rubenfeld includes one last wrinkle regarding
consent in his proposal that undoes any of his suggested gains (while doing
nothing to mitigate the downside). He notes that consent would not be entirely
removed from his proposal. Instead, he states that "[r]ape as a violation of self-
possession would ask whether the violence was consented to." 63 He contends
that this consent question would not be subject to the problems he associates
with modem consent elements because "[w]hether a person wanted sex may be
easily put in question; whether a person affirmatively gave her permission to be
bound, cut, whipped, threatened, and so on, is more difficult to make an issue
of." 
64
Rubenfeld omits one basic fact of criminal rape cases, particularly non-
stranger rape prosecutions, which practitioners in the area know well: people
lie. Rape cases, whether prosecuted or not, usually amount to competing
narratives about events for which there is no documentary evidence.' If there
were actually consistent stories or objective video recording, rape law would be
161. Anderson, supra note 4, at 645-46.
162. See NAT'L. VICTIM CTR., supra note 6, at 4 (discussing data showing the rarity of serious
physical injury or threatened serious physical injury in reported rapes).
163. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 1437. See also id. at 1436 ("Only sex coerced through bodily
violence wrests from the victim her fundamental bodily self-possession-and is therefore rape.").
164. Id. at 1438.
165. There are different theories as to how narrative competition occurs in the context of modem
rape trials. Andrew Taslitz, for example, uses "storytelling theory" to better understand rape trials.
TASLITZ, supra note 61, at 15. Under Taslitz's theory, "the story of a case must be told in a way as to
satisfy a jury's needs for narrative coherence and fidelity." Id. Coherence is the internal consistency of a
story. Id. Fidelity is the degree to which a story appeals to a juror's sense of reality. Id. Taslitz identifies
at least four common rape story narratives that dominate trials: silenced voices, bullying, black beasts,
and a little more persuading. Id. at 19-36. Susan Ehrlich's scholarship focuses on understanding of
"talk" about rape. SUSAN EHRLICH, REPRESENTING RAPE: LANGUAGE AND SEXUAL CONSENT 4 (2001).
Ehrlich argues that "language is the primary vehicle through which cultural and institutional ideologies-
are transmitted in legal settings." Id. The "talk" of witnesses is mediated and filtered through the legal,
cultural, and institutional values present in a courtroom. Id. Because those values are heavily gendered,
the "talk" of the courtroom reinforces and replicates the more systemic dialogue of patriarchy. Id.
Kimberld Crenshaw contends that accusers inevitably become pigeonholed into one of several
categorical stereotypes including "the whore, the tease, the vengeful liar, the mentally or emotionally
unstable, or, in a few instances, the madonna." Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Whose Story is it Anyway?, in
RACE-ING JUSTICE AND EN-GENDERING POWER 402, 409 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992).
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much simpler. Instead, the stories that victims and rapists tell are quite
different. In a world where Rubenfeld's statute were adopted, rapists could
merely assert that consent, verbal or nonverbal, was given to the violence
involved. Or in the case of constructive force, a defendant will claim no threat
was made. If there were bruises or other physical injuries, defendants would
still be able to argue successfully, if the past record is any indicator, that the
victim asked for the "rough sex."1 66 Shifting consent to the force element
instead of the sex act element does not escape the difficulties with the concept
of sexual autonomy-it simply changes how defendants and their lawyers
characterize the alleged consent given by the victim.
B. Real Rape Problems
The motivation for Rubenfeld's project is that he believes the rape-by-
deception riddle is a critical problem in rape law today. He is not arguing that
incidents of rape-by-deception are the significant harm (his solution does not
criminalize or otherwise address such cases), but rather that the doctrinal
incoherence created by his identified riddle are worrisome. His concern is
entirely misdirected. As previously discussed, rape law specifically and sex-
crime law generally are replete with inconsistencies. The rape-by-deception
puzzle is an unnecessary tangent, a minor quibble in a sea of contradictions.
There are far more important issues in rape law that Rubenfeld's proposal does
not address and actually makes worse. In particular, rape is occurring at an
increasing rate, law enforcement is exhibiting greater indifference to rape
victims, and politicians are endorsing policies based upon their skepticism of
rape victims. If rape law were premised on a right to self-possession, each of
those harms would likely increase in quantity and degree.
1. Rape Prevalence
The most significant issue in rape law today is the failure to abate the high
rate of sexual violence in the United States. The conventional story about the
rates of violent crime generally, and rape specifically, is that they have been
declining at unprecedented levels since the early 1990s.167 Even so, the rate of
166. Corey Rayburn [Yung], To Catch a Sex Thief The Burden ofPerformance in Rape and Sexual
Assault Trials, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 437, 459 (2006) ("That is, the defense strategy in most rape
cases is to argue that the rape was simulated. Defense attorneys do not use the term 'simulated,' but
when they say 'it was just rough sex' or 'bruises are normal,' they are saying the rape was only an
illusion, a facsimile, a copy, a simulation.").
167. See, e.g., MARY Louis FRAMPTON ET AL., AFTER THE WAR ON CRIME: RACE, DEMOCRACY,
AND A NEW RECONSTRUCTION 1 (2008) (noting that low crime rates have led to declarations of victory
in order to move the focus to other issues confronting America).
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rape here remains the highest of any nation in the West. A closer look at the
rape statistics shows that even the progress in decreasing American sexual
violence is likely illusory.
Rape statistics are compiled annually by the FBI through the Uniform
Crime Reports (UCR) program.169 The UCR data indicates that the rate of rape
has been steadily declining since the early 1990s.o70 Unfortunately, several
168. DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY 119 (1997)
(noting that even low estimates of crime rates indicate that "the United States has the highest rate of
reported rape in the Western industrial world.").
169. Although participation in the UCR program has been voluntary, over 95% of police
departments nationwide presently supply crime data to the FBI. See NATHAN JAMES & LOGAN RISHARD
COUNCIL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34309, How CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES IS MEASURED 3
(2008), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34309.pdf. Those participating departments cover
approximately 97% of the population of the United States. See FRANK E. HAGAN, INTRODUCTION TO
CRIMINOLOGY: THEORIES, METHODS, AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 26 (2010). The UCR system is not
without its flaws. The UCR relies exclusively on reports to police, which has meant that, by the very
nature of the system, unreported crimes have not been included. JAMES & COUNCIL, supra, at 18. For the
crime of rape, this is a particular concern because up to an estimated 84% of incidents have, in recent
years, not been reported to police. See Dean Kilpatrick & Jenna McCauley, Understanding National
Rape Statistics, NAT'L RES. CTR. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 2, 3 (Sept. 2009),
http://www.vawnet.org/research/print-document.php?docid=2103&findtype=web desc_AR. Further,
the system has relied on police officers to make UCR classifications with neither proper training nor
guidance which may affect the data. JAMES & COUNCIL, supra at 18-19; Kimberly A. Lonsway &
Joanne Archambault, The "Justice Gap "for Sexual Assault Cases: Future Directions for Research and
Reform, 18 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 145, 149 (2012).
Despite the shortcomings of the system, the UCR has remained the dominant source of information
about crime levels and rates in the United States. The media has uncritically reported the statistics from
the program without noting the limitations of the data. See generally HAGAN, supra; JAMES & COUNCIL,
supra. Police departments wishing to show progress in fighting crime have focused on decreasing their
UCR statistics. The UCR data has often served as the basis for crime and social policy in America.
Congress has allocated funds to police departments based upon their successes reported in the UCR
statistics. The UCR data has also regularly been used by policymakers to evaluate the efficacy of
criminal justice programs. See JAMES & COUNCIL, supra, at 2 ("UCR data are now used extensively by
academics and government officials for research, policy, and planning purposes, and the data are widely
cited in the media. The UCR also provides some of the most commonly cited crime statistics in the
United States."); LARRY J. SIEGEL, CRIMINOLOGY 30 (2011) ("The UCR is the best known and most
widely cited source of official criminal statistics."); Lonsway & Archambault, supra, at 149
("[Widespread citation to the UCR] is ... likely attributable to the credibility afforded by the FBI's
prominent support of the [UCR], which may understandably lead public officials, members of the
media, and the public to conclude that the UCR is the authoritative source for information on crime
reporting.").
170. The summary statistics in the annual UCR are available directly from the FBI. See Uniform
Crime Reports, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr (last
visited May 19, 2015). The raw data, released well after the annual UCR, is available from the National
Archive of Criminal Justice Data (NACJD). See Uniform Crime Reports Data, NAT'L ARCHIVE OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/content/NACJD/guides/ucr.html, (last
visited May 19, 2015). The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) has also created a data analysis tool that
allows for quick analysis of certain variables in the UCR data. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Unform
Crime Reports Data Analysis Tool, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ucrdata/ (last updated Mar. 29, 2010). The
data used in my study can be derived from all three sources, as the data used in this study is consistent
between each. Because of the ease of accessing data over time (as opposed to within a single calendar
year), much of the data was from the BJS, which allows for the production of custom time-series data.
However, because of the limited variables available from that the BJS, data from the FBI and NACJD
were utilized as well.
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police departments have been caught intentionally suppressing their official
-- 171
rape statistics to create paper reductions in crime.
In 2010, the Baltimore Sun exposed the Baltimore Police Department's
practice of substantially undercounting reported rapes in the UCR data it
submitted to the FBI.172 From 1995 until 2010, the Baltimore Police
Department provided UCR numbers that indicated that the rate of rape had
declined by a remarkable eighty percent in the city. The investigation by the
Baltimore Sun ultimately demonstrated that the incredible reported reduction in
rape was the product of police concocting crime statistics to create the illusion
of success in fighting crime. 173 The Baltimore Police Department is not alone in
improperly manipulating UCR rape statistics during the past two decades.
Media investigations caught police "red-handed" in New Orleans, Philadelphia,
and St. Louis, having submitted crime statistics that substantially undercounted
the number of rapes in their respective jurisdictions. 174 The cheating police
departments were able to lower their official counts for rape through difficult-
to-detect techniques. 75  As a result of using those methods, the police
171. See Justin Fenton, City Rape Statistics Questioned-Baltimore Police Label Many Cases
'Unfounded' Officers Defend Tactics, but Mayor Orders Review, BALT. SUN, June 27, 2010, at IA
(detailing the suspiciously low number of reported rapes in Baltimore are like other metropolitan cites
like "Washington D.C., San Diego, San Francisco, and Atlanta are among cities with rates comparable
to Baltimore's," which suggests underreporting there as well).
172. Justin Fenton, Chief Says Shooting Focus Affected Rape Probes, BALT. SUN, July 20, 2010, at
4A; see also Justin Fenton, City out of Top 5 For Murder Rate; Drop is 1st in Years; Rape Numbers up
Sharply in Wake Of Police Reporting Reforms, BALT. SUN, June 12, 2012, at 2A (detailing the role of
the Baltimore Sun in uncovering police underreporting of rape to the FBI as part of the UCR program)
[hereinafter Fenton, City out of Top 5]; Fenton, supra note 171 at IA.
173. Fenton, supra note 171 at IA.
174. See Mark Fazlollah, Michael Matza & Craig R. McCoy, How to Cut City's Crime Rate: Don't
Report It, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 1, 1998, at A01 (describing the process the Philadelphia police used to
avoid reporting rapes to the FBI as part of the UCR program); Jeremy Kohler, Waivers Wipe Out
Reports of Rape, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 29, 2005, at Al ("Sex crimes detectives used [rape
complaint] waivers several dozen times in the previous two years, a Post-Dispatch review has found.
Many of the cases went uncounted in crime statistics, although they should have been included under
uniform crime reporting guidelines."); Laura Maggi, NOPD Downgrading of Rape Reports Raises
Questions, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans) (July 11, 2009),
http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2009/07/nopd-downgradingof rape repor.html ("More than half
the time New Orleans police receive reports of rape or other sexual assaults against women, officers
classify the matter as a noncriminal 'complaint."'); Michael Matza, Victims' Testimony at Congressional
Hearing Show "Chronic Failure" in Rape Investigations, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 15, 2010, at BI
("Philadelphia police had severely underreported rapes for decades through the 1990s, a problem
brought to light by Inquirer investigative reporting .... ).
175. Because the FBI provides little to no oversight regarding the numbers reported by police
departments, absent the rare investigative journalism, police have been free to "cook the books" without
fear of discovery. See Michael D. Maltz, Missing UCR Data and Divergence of the NCVS and UCR
Trends, in UNDERSTANDING CRIME STATISTICS 269, 270 (James P. Lynch & Lynn A. Addington eds.,
2007). First, police departments exploited the UCR rule that they did not have to count rapes if "an
agency determine[d] that complaints of [rape were] unfounded or false." See Fenton, City out of Top 5,
supra note 172, at 2A; Kohler, supra note 174, at Al (describing the rape complaint "waivers" process
wherein alleged rape victims who did not want to pursue prosecution, for whatever reason, were told
they had to sign the waiver classifying their rape complaint as "unfounded"); Maggi, supra note 174;
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Uniform Crime Reports: Crime in the United States, 2011, DEP'T OF
JUSTICE 2 (2011), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/201 I/crime-in-the-u.s.-
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departments in Baltimore, New Orleans, Philadelphia, and St. Louis were able
to create fictional drops in violent crime rates and claim victory in their battles
against sexual violence. 7 6
I recently completed a study that used the data from Baltimore, New
Orleans, Philadelphia, and St. Louis to create a profile for jurisdictions
undercounting incidents of rape.1 77 I identified forty-two additional police
departments covering populations of at least 100,000 people that likely
substantially undercounted the number of rapes reported using a fraudulent data
statistical test derived from the practices in the four jurisdictions that were
caught cheating. Jurisdictions manipulating their rape numbers have
significantly altered the historical statistics regarding the prevalence of rape in
America and, as a result, our society's understanding of the magnitude of
sexual violence in this country.
In total, I found that approximately 796,213 to 1,145,309 rapes were not
included in the UCR due to police undercounting during that time. Further, the
corrected data indicated that the years from 1995 to 2012, even using the low
estimate, have had the fifteen highest rates of rape since the UCR began
reporting rape data in 1930. In contrast to the widely held conventional
wisdom, the rate of rape in America has not decreased over the last twenty
years as has been the case for other violent crimes. Instead, America is in a
crisis of sexual violence that has gone undetected because of systemic
underreporting of rape by police departments across the country.
By removing consent from rape statutes and utilizing a narrow force
requirement, Rubenfeld ensures that the largest percentage of reported rapes,
where the victim knows her rapist and little or no force is used, cannot possibly
be prosecuted. Under Rubenfeld's statute, "no" will not mean "no" and victims
will be forced to engage in substantial resistance to trigger the force (or threat
of force) necessary for there to be a subsequent rape prosecution. In a time of
rape crisis in America, Rubenfeld's proposal, which decriminalizes much of
rape, is particularly dangerous. And trying to achieve doctrinal coherence is an
insignificant concern in the face of widespread increasing rape.
201 I/methodologyfinal.pdf ("When, through investigation, an agency determines that complaints of
crimes are unfounded or false, the agency eliminates that offense from its crime tally through an entry
on the monthly report."). Second, the police departments suppressed their reported numbers by regularly
classifying rape complaints as lesser offenses that were not part of the core UCR statistics sent to the
FBI. See Fenton, City out of Top 5, supra note 172, at 2A; Matza, supra note 174, at Bl. Third, police
officers in those jurisdictions often failed to create any written record that a rape complaint was ever
made in order to eliminate the incident from the UCR data. One scholar estimated that no written record
was made in 40% of rape complaints in Baltimore from 2003 to 2010. See Rape in the United States:
The Chronic Failure to Report and Investigate Rape Cases: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 11Ith Cong. (2010) (testimony of Carol Tracy, Exec. Dir., Women's Law Project). See also
Fenton, supra note 171, at IA; Kohler, supra note 174, at Al; Matza, supra note 174, at Bl.
176. Fenton, supra note 171, at IA; Kohler, supra note 174, at Al; Matza, supra note 174, at B I.
177. Corey Rayburn Yung, How to Lie with Rape Statistics, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1197 (2014).
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2. Law Enforcement Failure
Related to the increasing prevalence of rape, the enforcement of rape
statutes is actually declining. When looking at the relevant numbers, it is a
wonder that any rapists are actually imprisoned. We live in a world where rape
is incredibly underreported, reported rapes are not regularly investigated,
arrests in rape cases are rare, prosecutors are loath to take rape cases that might
jeopardize their high conviction rates, and convictions at trial are less likely
than in other crimes. A typical rape case can fall apart at any stage through the
criminal justice system even when the rape victim is firmly committed to
potentially years of participating in the arduous process.
Even in the rare cases of conviction, appellate courts continue to apply
antiquated ideas about what constitutes rape to reverse guilty verdicts. For
example, in 2011, a state appellate court in Louisiana overturned a jury
conviction for rape when, as the appellate court described, the defendant
"struck the victim with his fists, forced her to remove her clothing at knife
point, and had sexual intercourse with the victim against her will." In
wielding the knife, the defendant ordered the victim to disrobe while stating:
"[I]f you want to act like a whore, I'm going to treat you like a whore."17 9
Nonetheless, the court reversed the jury verdict of guilty on the rape charge
because "the victim stated that she resisted the Defendant verbally, but did not
get up and leave the room because she was scared." 80
Internalizing the norms of the criminal justice system, police have
increasingly acted as gatekeepers to inhibit rape victims from pushing their
cases forward. Police are arresting rapists at a lower rate and mistreatment of
rape victims continues. During the 1970s, one out of two rape reports led to an
arrest.' 8 ' Since 2005 that rate has dropped to one out of every four reported
rapes.182 The rate of clearance of rape cases by police has declined from
approximately fifty percent to about forty percent of reported rapes from 1999
to 2010.18 Police have often aggressively interrogated and harassed rape
victims to recant their allegations in order to achieve departmental goals for
decreased crime.184 In many cases, police have assured victims that they were
178. Louisiana v. Touchet, 897 So. 2d 900, 901 (La. Ct. App. 2005)
179. Id. at 903.
180. Id.
181. See Lonsway & Archambault, supra note 169, at 150.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 149-50.
184. See Justin Fenton, Downgrading Rape Cases Not A New Problem-Crime Beat Issues Go
Back Decades, With Pressure For Good Numbers, BALT. SUN, June 30, 2010, at 6A (detailing how the
investigation of the Baltimore Police investigation and reporting procedures "have discouraged women
from reporting sexual attacks in order to achieve a statistical drop in the city's number of rapes.
Baltimore police deem nearly one-third of rape reports 'unfounded,' meaning they believe that they are
false or baseless-more than in any other city in the country, according to an investigation by the
Baltimore Sun. . . . Police in Baltimore are continually accused of fudging the numbers. Police leaders
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busy working on their cases while no actual investigation was being done
because the complaint had already been labeled "unfounded."'185 When police
have failed to fully investigate rape complaints, the result has been that serial
rapists, who constitute an estimated ninety-one to ninety-five percent of all
rapists, are free to rape, and sometimes murder, more victims. 186
Rubenfeld's proposal also plays into the hands of indifferent police officers
who are increasingly blocking rape cases. With such a high threshold for force,
police can ignore any rape victim who isn't on the verge of death. Indeed, if
rape is limited to such cases, police departments will have little incentive to
keep officers assigned to rape cases. The growing use of specialized rape crime
units, well known because of the television show Law & Order: Special
Victims Unit,187 would surely be reversed as tight budgets cannot warrant
dedicated units for narrow crimes. In an era marked by high rates of sexual
violence and police suppression of rape cases, Rubenfeld's proposal is among
the worst imaginable among all conceivable possibilities.
3. Rape in the Modern Political Landscape
Rubenfeld writes his article questioning the scope of rape law at a time
when the political landscape has increasingly welcomed such ideas. He is not
just innocently pontificating about theoretical nuances isolated from a larger
social context. Rubenfeld is giving intellectual cover to those who would
rollback modern rape law for a variety of different purposes.
The political campaigns leading to the 2012 elections provide salient
examples of the growing chorus of voices seeking to circumscribe the
definition and/or minimize the harm of rape. During the period before the
elections, the following thoughts were vocalized by the politicians identified:
So the way [my father] said it was, "Just remember, Roger, some girls,
they rape so easy. It may be rape the next morning."188 - Roger Rivard,
Wisconsin State Representative
are only as good as their stats, and the pressure to get them lower, whether explicitly stated or implied, is
intense. And it's a time-honored practice, law enforcement experts say, in a culture that relies on
evaluating job performance through statistics and in which police officers harbor an inherent distrust for
victims and suspects alike.... Rape and sexual assault cases areamong the easiest to hide.").
185. Lonsway & Archambault, supra note 169, at 161.
186. See Kimberly A. Lonsway, Trying to Move the Elephant in the Living Room: Responding to
the Challenge ofFalse Rape Reports, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1356, 1365 (2010).
187. Law & Order: Special Victims Unit (NBC).
188. Patrick Marley, Ryan, Walker Yank Rivard Endorsements, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 12,
2012, at Al (quoting Roger Rivard).
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And even when life begins in that horrible situation of rape, that it is
something that God intended to happen.' 89 - Richard Mourdock,
United States Senate candidate from Indiana
[In the emergency room they have] what's called rape kits where a
woman can get cleaned out [and not get pregnant]. 190 - Jodie
Laubenberg, Texas State Senator
It seems to be, first of all, from what I understand from doctors,
[pregnancy from rape is] really rare. If it's a legitimate rape, the female
body has ways to try to shut the whole thing down.191 - Todd Akin,
United States Senate candidate from Missouri
The horrific rape in Steubenville led one scholar to offer this strange
thought experiment on his high-profile blog:
Let's suppose that you, or I, or someone we love, or someone we care
about from afar, is raped while unconscious in a way that causes no
direct physical harm-no injury, no pregnancy, no disease
transmission. (Note: The Steubenville rape victim, according to all the
accounts I've read, was not even aware that she'd been sexually
assaulted until she learned about it from the Internet some days later.)
Despite the lack of physical damage, we are shocked, appalled and
horrified at the thought of being treated in this way, and suffer deep
trauma as a result. Ought the law discourage such acts of rape? Should
they be illegal? 9 2
Such queries, like Rubenfeld's, represent a dangerous sea change in public
and political discourse about rape. The disastrous prosecution of members of
the Duke Lacrosse Team for rape led many to believe that false accusations of
rape are the norm. Chief among those attacking modem rape law as too
expansive after the Duke case is Professor K.C. Johnson who concludes that:
"Rape law needs modification. Until the 1970s, rape law was far too friendly to
the defendant; now it is the reverse."
193
The above comments add needed context to Rubenfeld's article. Writing
from a privileged position at Yale Law School and publishing in the Yale Law
189. Jonathan Weisman, Bad Luck and Missteps Make G.O.P.'s Senate Climb Steeper, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 2012, at Al (quoting Richard Mourdock).
190. Overdue Help, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Aug. 29, 2013, at A16 (quoting Jodie Laubenberg).
191. Katharine Q. Seelye, Another Senate Race Seizes on Rape Remark, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23,
2012, at Al5 (quoting Todd Akin).
192. Steve Landsburg, Censorship, Environmentalism and Steubenville, BIG QUESTIONS (Mar. 20,
2013), http://www.thebigquestions.com/2013/03/20/censorship-environmentalism-and-steubenville.




Journal, Rubenfeld lends authoritative credence to those seeking a curtailment
of substantive rape law. Notably, among all of the quoted positions,
Rubenfeld's may be the least defensible. Rubenfeld does not support non-
forcible non-stranger rape decriminalization because he is concerned about
innocent men being convicted. He is not driven by beliefs about abortion that
intersect with discussions about rape. He is not writing out of a mistaken
understanding of rape kits and pregnancy. Rubenfeld supports his regressive
turn in rape law only in the name of doctrinal coherence. In the end, Rubenfeld
empowers and enables the backlash against the limited progress that has been
made to advance rape laws since the 1970s.
CONCLUSION
By exposing the missteps Rubenfeld makes, I hope to help prevent such
mistakes from being repeated. Rape law is a thorny area that reflects a range of
complex cultural, historical, and social issues. Because of that, writing about
solutions to rape's wicked problem is not easy. Rubenfeld has simply stumbled
into a briar patch that he is unable to theorize his way out of.
I choose to highlight the problems of rape prevalence, political hostility to
rape victims, and rape law underenforcement to illustrate how out-of-touch
Rubenfeld's theory really is. Rather than focusing on stemming the high rates
of sexual violence in America, Rubenfeld believes the issue for us to focus
upon is resolving minor perceived inconsistencies in doctrine. Further,
Rubenfeld's proposal aggravates the problems I describe by severely limiting
the number of rapes that could be prosecuted.
Nonetheless, there is value to be found in following the direction that
Rubenfeld points toward. Much can be gained by greater recognition of the
fundamental values of rape law. The four animating principles that I discuss for
the existence of the crime of rape offer a solid foundation that can offer
substantive benefits. Simply put, rape is a gendered crime that causes greater
harm than ordinary assaults and terrorizes potential targets of rape. Sexual
autonomy is the means by which rape and consensual sex are separated. Each
core concept has not been given full effect in the codification, enforcement, and
punishment of rape. Rape law scholarship of the foundational type in which
Rubenfeld engages can do much to explore the role of those lodestar principles
in the substance of rape law.
The possibilities for inculcating rape law with its fundamental values offer
a new avenue for addressing sexual violence. For example, although gender has
been a prominent concern in rape law scholarship and in modem procedural
and evidentiary rules such as rape-shield laws, there has been limited
integration of the fundamental value of gender into the substantive offense of
rape. A gender-conscious interpretation of rape statutes that has been strongly
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resisted by courts is to recognize how physical size differentials between
victims and rapists implicate both the force and consent elements. 194 By giving
the gender dynamics that provide part of the foundation of rape law greater
effect, such interpretations are called into question.
Rather than focusing on procedural and substantive statutory tinkering, an
approach that has had diminishing returns, we can explore how the values of
rape law should shade the interpretations of existing rules and statutes.
However, a full discussion of how fundamental values of rape law can and
should be better interwoven into doctrine and statute will have to wait for
another day and is beyond the scope of this Article. By better theorizing the
foundations of substantive rape law, the fight against rape can shift its focus
where it is most needed: in the minds of police, judges, jurors, prosecutors, rape
victims, and potential rapists.
194. John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, "No" Still Means "Yes": The Failure of the "Non-Consent"
Reform Movement in American Rape and Sexual Assault Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081,
1117 (2011) ("The court reasoned that the only force applied to the victim was the weight of the
defendant's body on top of her and that this was not enough force to establish forcible compulsion.").
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